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Canada was the first country to enact comprehensive  laws could be adapted to deal with cross-border
antitrust legislation (in 1889) and the first to institute  pricing practices of foreign private enterprises, they
an antidumping system (in 1904).  Canada's original  do not readily address pricing practices of foreign
"unfair"  trade legislation reflected a desire to prohibit  governments. Under an "economywide" perspective,
predatory dumping - pricing practices by foreign  on the other hand, both private and public contentious
exporters designed "to crush out the native Canadian  pricing practices could be evaluated to determine
industry."  But the result of Canada's recent enforce-  how, on balance, the national economic interest
ment of unfair trade laws has been high levels of  would best be served.  All allegations of unfair
protection for a few well-organized firms. Serious  dumping and subsidies would be examined by
predatory, anticompetitive concerns were probably  comparing the impact of current pricing practices on
not at issue in any of the cases in which antidumping  economic efficiency with the impact of alternate
duties were assessed.  feasible forms of intervention so that the chosen
policy action results in the largest possible net
Canada's recent overhaul of its unfair trade  economywide gains.
legislation was not followed by any dramatic change
in enforcement practice.  If anything, the protection  The concrete proposals Canada presented during
bias of Canadian enforcement has increased.  The bias  the Free Trade Agreemer i negotiations to regulate
against exports from developing countries has also  Canada-U.S. cross-borde. pricing issues by competi-
increased significantly in the years following imple-  tion principles demonstrate that the competition
mentation of the revised antidumping and  policy alternative is workable.  But as Canada's unfair
countervailing duty legislation (known as SIMA).  trade laws are administered currently, the
economywide perspective fits in more readily than
Comparing cases involving developed and  competition policy. Relatively minor changes to
developing countries suggests a protectionist bias  existing laws - requiring, for instance, mandatory
against the developing country bloc. This bias  public interest hearings for each case considered by
increased in the years following the implementation  the Tribunal, to explicitly consider the economywide
of SIMA:  while the share of imports from developing  impact of various forms of policy intervention - are
countries fell to 11 percent, their share of unfair trade  readily feasible.
cases increased to 44 percent.
Unfortunately, international standards, as
Dutz argues that an approach based on competi-  codified in the GATT and as practiced by Australia,
tion policy principles or on an economywide perspec-  the EC, and the United States, weigh against Canada
tive, by focusing on the broader impact of policies,  modifying its current standard.  Canada - the first
offers an economically more rational way to deal with  country to institute an antidumping system - is now
issues currently addressed by unfair trade remedies.  constrained from adopting more sensible policies by
While unfair trade laws aim to protect domestic  the weight and momentum of the system it helpeu to
cemp-;.itors, competition laws strive to protect the  develop.
competitive process.  Although existing competition
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Notes  47I. Introduction
Structural  features  of the  Canadian  economy  --  the  relatively  small  size
of the  domestic  market,  a high  level  of industrial  concentration  in  many
sectors,  and  a substantial  and  increasing  dependence  on international  trade  --
have exerted  an important  influence  on public  policy.  Canada  was the  first
country  to enact  comprehensive  antitrust  legislation  (1889)  and  the first  to
inst-Lute  an antidumping  system  (1904).'  Demand  for  competition  policy
legislation  arose  largely  from  concerns  about  the  trusts  that  were restricting
supply  and raising  prices  behind  newly  erected  protective  tariff  barriers;  the
earliest  legislation  attempted  to  control  monopoly  power  abuses,  apparently
without  regard  to economic  efficiency.  Canada's  original  "unfair"  trade
legislation  reflected  a desire  to prohibit  predatory  dumping,  or pricing
practices  by foreign  exporters  designed  "to  crush  out  the  native  Canadian
industry"  (Canadian  minister  of finance,  cited  in  Goldman  1987,  96).  Although
the  rhetoric  of Canada's  first  "unfair"  trade  legislation  was antipredation,
the  legislation  did  not explicitly  require  evidence  of  predation.
In  principle,  competition  laws  constitute  a domestic  counterpart  to
"unfair"  trade  laws,  especially  in the  area  of price  discrimination  and
predatory  behavior.  In application,  however,  the  two  sets  of laws  have
diverged  widely.  As competition  laws  were being  refined  and structured  to
protect  the competitive  process,  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty laws  were
increasingly  focused  on protecting  domestic  producers  from  foreign  competitive
pressures,  and the  antipredation  element  was quickly  forgotten.
Canada's  competition  and "unfair"  trade  laws  underwent  major revision  in
the  1980s,  opening  up potential  new  avenues  for  compromise  on protection  law.
The revised  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty legislation  included  a new
public  interest  provision  for  incorporating  broader  economic  principles  into
the "unfair"  trade  remedies  process  in an attempt  to ensure  that  decisions
correspond  to  Canada's  national  economic  interests.  Increased  concern  for
applying  competition  principles  to cross-border  discriminatory  pricing  issues
1also  emerged  during  this  period  in  negotiations  for  the  Canada-U.S.  Ftee  Trade
Agreement.  Canada's  objectives  during  the  negotiations  were to eliminate  all
border  measures  to trade  between  the  two  countries. However,  Canada's
position  was  that  some  forms  of discipline  were likely  necessary  for
particular  pricing  practices;  as part  of an overall  approach  to "unfair"  trade
practices,  Canada  sought  to replace  existing  antidumping  laws  with a
competition  law  based  system. 2
Despite  changes  in the  legislation,  however,  enforcement  practices  have
retained  their  protectionist  bias,  providing  "relief"  for  interests  that  would
nor gain  relief  under  a conceptual  framework  emphasizing  competition
principles  or an economywide  perspective.  This  paper  reviews  Canada's  recent
enforcement  of "unfair"  trade  laws  and  analyzes  it against  the  objectives  and
standards  of these  two  alternative  means  of regulat\ing  cross-border  pricing
issues.  It argues  that  both offer  a  workable  and  a  more economically  rational
way of serving  the  national  interest  and  responding  to the  problems  now dealt
with by the  trade  laws,  though  existing  competition  laws  do not address
perceived  "unfair"  foreign  pricing  practices  originating  in the  public  sector.
The economic  impact  of the  two  approaches  is  roughly  equivalent,  but  the
economywide  perspective  fits  in  more readily  than competition  policy  with the
current  administration  of Canada's  "unfair"  trade  laws.  Only  minor  changes  to
existing  laws  would  be needed  to ensure  that  an economywide  perspective  guided
both antidumping  and  countervail  procedures.  Even  though  the  relevant  GATT
regulations  would  allow  such  efficiency-enhancing  changes,  international
standards  for  "unfair"  trade  actions,  as  practiced  by tha  United  States,  the
European  Community  (EC),  and  Australia,  remain  an obstacle  to  modification  of
Canada's  current  standard  into  an economically  more sensible  one.
II.  Regulations  to curb  discriminatory  pricing  practices
Since  important  sections  of Canada's  competition  legislation  are
concerned  with discriminatory  pricing  practices,  an overview  of these  laws
2provides  a context  for  evaluating  Canadian  "unfair"  trade  remedies
enforcement.  Trade  and  competition  regulations  dealing  with discriminatory
pricing  practices  are  structured  in  a roughly  similar  fashion,  moving  from  a
determination  of the  "offense,"  to an "injury"  test,  and culminating  in the
application  of "remedies."1 3 Both sets  of laws  are  concerned  with the  impact
of pricing  practices  on the  domestic  economy,  but  each tends  to  protect
different  economic  interests.  Competition  laws  strive  to protect  the
competitive  process,  "unfair"  trade  laws  to protect  domestic  competitors.
11.1.  Competition  policy  regulations  and an economywide  perspective
The revised  Competition  Act  of 1986  states  that  the  aim  of competition
policy  in Canada  is to "maintain  and encourage  competition  in  Canada  in order
to promote  the  efficiency  and  adaptability  of the  Canadian  economy,  in order
to expand  opportunities  for  Canadian  participation  in  world  markets  while at
the  same  time recognizing  the  role  of foreign  competition  in Canada,  ...  and
in order  to  provide  consumers  with competitive  prices  and  product  choices"
(section  1.1).  Encouraging  competition  has  as a primary  goal  the  efficient  use
of resources.  The role  of foreign  firms  in providing  domestic  competition
where  it  may otherwise  be lacking  in Canada's  relatively  small  economy  is
clearly  recognized.  Canada  is unusual  among  industrial  economies  in its  use  of
sector-specific,  trade  liberalization  measures  as remedies  for  antitrust
violations  .*
Provisions  of the  competition  laws  dealing  with price  discrimination  and
predatory  pricing  are  the  most closely  related  to issues  arising  in
transborder  pricing  practices.  The  new  act strengthens  the  role  of the
director  of investigation  and research  of the  Department  of Consumer  and
Corporate  Affairs,  Bureau  of Competition  Policy,  as the  general  competition
watchdog  in regulatory  proceedings 5. The director  has  the  capacity  to address
the  competitive  implications  of decisions  of the  Canadian  international  trade
authorities  on transborder  pricing  practices  during  the  public  hearing  part  of
3the  process.  Enforcement  of the  competition  laws  is governed  primarily  by the
criminal  law  prohibitions  of section  50 (on  illegal  trade  practices).
(i)  Price  discrimination.  The  Competition  Act  distinguishes  between
vertical  or intercustomer  price  discrimination  and  geographic  price
discrimination.  The law  on vertical  price  discrimination  governs  the
relationship  between  suppliers  and  buyers  and  is designed  to prevent  large
buyers  from  gaining  advantage  over  smaller  ones.  Enforcement  does  not require
an inquiry  into  economic  consequences  since  the  specific  elements  that  define
the  prohibited  conduct  do not require  measurement.  As in  the related  laws
(where  the  word "policy"  is  used),  the  discriminatory  pricing  must  be part  of
a "practice  of discriminating";  isolated  ircidents  of discrimination  --  say  to
meet  aggressive  spot  competition  --  are  permitted.
The geographic  price  discrimination  law  applies  to suppliers  who use
different  pricing  practices  in  different  geographic  markets  and is designed  to
prevent  a lessening  of competition  through  the  subsidizing  of sales  in one
region  from  receipts  earned  in  another.  In principle,  this law  has the
greatest  overlap  with existing  antidumping  laws,  the  main superficial
difference  being  whether  markets  are delineated  domestically  or
internationally.  However,  in contrast  to antidumping  laws,  geographic  price
discriminatior.  and  predatory  pricing  laws  contain  an "effect-on-competition"
test.  To obtain  a conviction,  the  government  must show  "monopolizing  design"
or "a  visible  lessening  of competition."  Remedies  are  premised  on preeerving
or enhancing  competition,  and  punitive  sanctions  (imprisonment  for  two  years
and/or  large  fines)  are  imposed.
In practice,  very few  cases  have  been  brought  under  these  two  provisions
of the  law,  and there  have  been no convictions  for  geographic  price
discrimination  --  a practice  that  conforms  well  with the  prevailing  view in
economics  that  price  discrimination  is usually  innocuous  and is beneficial
when it  promotes  competition  (Varian  1989).  Given  the  criminal  standard  of
proof  that  must be  met, the  authorities  have been  reluctant  to  prosecute  when
the  evidence  showed  only the  accused  firm's  ability  to  weaken  target  firms  or
4to cause  them  to compete  less  vigorously,  rather  than  the  ability  to force
withdrawal  from  the  market. 6 When price  discrimination  demonstratea  a
predatory  purpose,  it should  be regulated  on that  basis.
(ii)  Predator,  pricing.  Predatory  pricing  is often  referred  to  as
"primary  line"  prico  discrimination  since  the  pricing  practice  is directed  at
economic  agents  at the  same  level  of production  or distribution.  Although
price  discrimination  is not  a constituent  element  of predation,  predatory
pricing  does  have  an anticipated  intertemporal  discriminatory  dimension,  with
the  predator  temporarily  lowering  prices  in  the  expectation  of substantially
raising  prices  in the  long  erxr.  The  law itself  does  not  require  any  evidence
of price  discrimination.  It  proh 4.bits  a "policy"  of selling  at "unreasonably
low"  prices  with the "intention,  tendency  or effect  of substantially  lessening
competition"  (Competition  Act, section  50[l][c]).  The  law  covers  both
practices  to drive  out  existing  competition  (classical  predation)  and
practices  to  preempt  or deter  entry (strategic  predation).
As with price  discrimination,  the  predatory  pricing  must be more than  a
short-term  reaction  to changes  in  the economic  environment  (such  as aggressive
pricing  by competitors).  The  frequency  of sales  and  the  length  of time  goods
are  sold  at the  questionable  prices  must also  be considered.  Exactly  what is
meant  by an "unreasonably  low"  price  has  been  left for  the  courts  to decide.
The argument  that  any  price  below  cost  is unreasonable  has  been rejected.  Case
history  suggests  that  prices  are  not  considered  "unreasonably  low"  if they
cover  variable  costs  but  not full  costs.  And even  when price  is  below  average
variable  cost,  all  the  circumstances  in the  case  must be considered  before  it
is judged  unreasonably  low'.  Thus in  virtually  all foreseeable  cases,  the
enforced  pricing  standard  is lower  than full  current  production  and financial
costs.
In bringing  predatory  pricing  cases  to trial,  the  Bureau  of Competition
Policy  may  use the  criminal  proh'bition  section  50(l)(c)  of the law  or it  may
proceed  under  the  civil-law-based  "abuse  of dominant  position"  provisions
(sections  78 and  79).  The  civil  procedure  involves  a  weaker  standard  of proof,
5but it carries  the  extra  burden  of demonstrating  that the  offender  is  in  a
position  of dominance. Importantly,  the  anticompetitive  pricing  must again
pass  an "effect-on-competition"  test;  the  law  also  explicitly  recognizes  that
superior  competitive  perrormance  is  not  anticompetitive.8
Canada's  competition  law  therefore  imposes  a  stringent  limit  on the
power  of the  state  to discipline  private  actions.  While  no judicial  authority
exists  for  determining  what constitutes  a "substantial  lessening  of
competition,"  legal  decisions  have  argued  that a  motive  of self-preservation
or  minimization  of losses  does  not  constitute  an intent  to lessen  competition.
(iii)  An economywide  perspective.  As an alternative  to competition
policy  regulations,  an economywide  perspective  also  provides  a  workable  and
economically  more rational  way to evaluate  cross-border  pricing  problems  than
current  "unfair"  trade  mechanisms.  Under  an economywide  perspective,
allegations  of  both "unfair"  dumping  and  subsidization  would  be examined  by
assessing  the  economic  efficiency  impact  on all  agents  within  the  economy
(including  producers,  intE  -mediate  users  and  consumers)  of existing  pricing
practices  versus  alternate  feasible  forms  of intervention.  Competing  claims  as
to how  benefits  and  injury  should  be distributed  between  domestic  interests
would  be evaluated  so that  the  chosen  policy  action  results  in the largest
possible  net economywide  gains.
Both competition  laws  and  the  economywide  perspective  view cross-border
pricing  problems  from  the  similar  economic  perspective  of intervening  to
promote  an efficient  allocation  of resources  throughout  the  national  economy.
Implementation  mechanisms  of the  economywide  perspective  are  very different
from  those  of the  competition  policy  approach,  however.  Competition  laws
intervene  in the  conduct  of business  and  the structure  of  markets,  seek  to
uncover  violations  of the criminal  and  civil  legal  codes,  and  rely  on
imprisonment  or fines  as remedies;  competition  laws  could  be adapted  to deal
with cross-border  pricing  practices  of foreign  private  enterprises,  but do  not
readily  address  pricing  practices  of foreign  governments.  An economywide
perspective,  on the  other  hand,  would  evaluate  a contentious  private  or public
6cross-border  pricing  practice  by comparing  its  long-run  benefits  and costs  to
the  economy  as a  whole to determine  how,  on balance,  the  national  economic
interest  would  best be served.
II.2.  Antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  regulations
The imposition  of antidumping  and  countervailing  duties  in Canada  is
governed  by the  Special  Import  Measures  Act (SIMA)  of 1984.9  SIMA  was
designed  to overhaul  previous  legislation  and  "to  make Canada's  legislation
more effective  in protecting  Canadian  producers  from  dumped  or subsidized
imports"  (Proceedings  of the  Standing  Senate  Committee  on  Banking  and
Commerce,  January  28, 1984,  as cited  in  Buchanan  1985,  2).  SIMA  replaced  the
formerly  separate  provisions  of the  Antidumping  Act and  the  Countervailing
Duty Regulations,  introducing  broadly  parallel  procedures.  While  this  reduced
the  degree  of  ministerial  discretion  available  in  countervailing  duty  cases
(Martin  1984,  4),  it also  meant that  such  cases  were  now  on an equal  footing
with antidumping  cases  and  therefore  that  countervailing  duties  could  be
applied  more readily  and  broadly  than  before  (Stegemann  1984,  44).
The reforms  followed  the 1979  revision  of the  GATT  Antidumping  Code and
the  GATT  Code of Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Duties.  While  the  review  of
Canada's  existing  legislation  concluded  that  no changes  were required  for
Canada  to  meet its  GATT  obligations,  changes  were deemed  necessary  to ensure
domestic  producers  full  recourse  to the  rights  specified  by the  new GATT  rules
(Martin  1984,  2).  Apparently,  the  government  also  felt some  obligation  to
provide  Canadian  firms,  which  had  cooperated  with the  government  during  the
recent  GATT  negotiations,  with a set  of protective  remedies  similar  to those
of their  foreign  couniterparts,  particularly  since  the  United  States  and the  EC
had already  implemented  new  legislation  (Stegemann  1984,  37).  The inclusion  in
SIMA,  for  the first  time,  of detailed  legislation  governing  countervailing
duties  was related  to the  U.S. government's  frequent  use  of such  measures
since  the  mid-seventies  (Hart  1989b).
7Another  motivation  behind  SIMA  was the  desire  to strer3then  the
government's  ability  to respond  to the  trade  practices  of other  governments  by
ensuring  that  Canada  had  all the  protectionist  measures  available  to other
nations  to use  as bargaining  chips  in  future  trade  negotiations. 10 This is an
example  of  what may  be termed  the "worst  common  denominator"  effect:  Canada
wanted  to be sure to  have a full  arsenal  of "unfair"  trade  remedies  and  a full
complement  of triggers  for  each  to be in a good  position  for  future  bargaining
over  reductions.  Given  these  motivations,  it is not surprising  that  many
discussants  at a policy  forum  on SIMA  concluded  that  the  new legislation
"showed  a  much  more protectionist  stance  being  taken  by the government"
(Stegemann  1984,  43).
SIMA contains  a two-track  system  for  resolving  domestic  complaints  of
dumping  and  foreign  government  subsidies.  The  procedures  are  governed  by
detailed  rules  intended  to insulate  the  process  from  direct  political
interference.  The  administrative  determination  of  dumping  or subsidy  is  made
by the  Assessment  Programs  Division  of the  Department  of  National  Revenue,
Customs,  and  Excise  (hereafter  referred  to as the  "Department"),  while the
determination  of material  injury  to domestic  production,  and  of causation,  is
made by an independent,  quasi-judicial  body,  the  Canadian  International  Trade
Tribunal."'  The responsibility  for  Canada's  trade  policy  is split
functionally  between  the  minister  of international  trade  and  the  minister  of
finance.
(i)  Overview  of "unfair"  trade  investigations.  A dumping  or subsidy
investigation  typically  begins  in response  to a complaint  registered  with the
Department  by a domestic  producer  or several  producers." 2 The  Department  has
twenty-one  days to determine  whether  the filing  is "properly  documented.""
Once  that is established the  Department  has thirty  days  to formally  initiate
an investigation  or reject  the  complaint.  To initiate  an investigation,  the
Department  must determine  that  the  complainant  represents  a "major  proportion
of producers  of like  goods,"  1
4 that  there  is evidence  that  goods  have  been
8dumped  or subsidized,  and  that  reasonable  grounds  exist for  believing  that  the
domestic  industry  is threatened  or has suffered  maaterial  injury.1"
Because  the  preinvestigation  filings  are  confidential,  exporters  and
importers  affected  by a dumping  complaint  may be unaware  of the  complaint
until  a  formal  decision  is  made to initiate  the  investigation  (Magnus  1989,
181).  The  only  challenge  to initiation  of an investigation  available  to
exporters,  importers,  foreign  governments,  or other  interested  parties
concerns  the  Department's  determination  of injury.  The advice  of the  Tribunal
can  be requested  in such  instances,  but  the  Tribunal  must restrict  its
investigation  to the  very  preliminary  information  on injury  received  by the
Department.  (Before  the  SIMA legislation,  not even  this  limited  provision  for
challenge  existed.)
Following  the formal  initiation  of an investigation,  the  Department
generally  has 180  days  to complete  its  administrative  determination  of the
dumping  margin  or the  amount  of the subsidy.  This time  limit,  a new feature
under  SZMA,  is  more advantageous  tc domestic  complainants  than  to exporters  or
importers.  Complainants  have  ample  time  prior  to formal  initiation  to collect
and  submit  information  favorable  to their  position,  while exporters  and
importers  have comparatively  very Little  time,  to collect  information  to argue
their  side  of the  issue.
Within  the first  ninety  days  following  the initiation  of an
investigation,  the  Department  makes  a  preliminary  determinati.on  of the  dumping
margin  or subsidy."'  the  preliminary  determination  is  based  on information
supplied  by questionnaires  (subsequently  verified)  submitted  to  each exporter
and importer  known  to have traded  the  goods  under  investigation.  There  are  no
provisions  for  holding  hearings  at  which  parties  can  present  informaticn  or
views in  an adversarial  setting.  While  SIMA  introduced  a statutory  right  of
access  to all  nonconfidential  information  (broadly  similar  to U.S.  and  EC
procedure),  in practice,  no effective  challenge  is  possible  since  confidential
portions  of submissions  to the  Department  remain  inaccessible."  An
9affirmative  prel4minary  determination  results  in  the imposition  of provisional
duties  --  the  early  deadline  permits  an early  imposition  of duties.
Once the  Department  has issued  a  preliminary  determination,  the  Trade
Tribunal  has 120  days  to complete  its  inquiry  on  material  injury  and
causation.  The  Tribunal's  prokeedings  under  SIMA  do not differ  greatly  from
those  under  the former  legislation,  except  that  the  Tribunal  now :.s  a  public
interest  advisory  role.  For its  injury  inquiry,  the  Tribunal  collects  as  much
data  a& it can  for the  four  preceding  years  of the  product  under
investigation;  however,  the  analysis  :s  relatively  simple  and  a model  oi the
market  in the  sense  commonly  understood  by economists  is not  developed.
The total  time limit  for  "unfair"  trade  proceedings  has  been shortened
considerably  under  SIMA,  since  the  Department's  final  determination  and  the
Tribunal's  injury  inquiry  now  begin  concu  rently  (previously,  the  final
determination  began  after  the  issuance  of an injury  finding).  Following  an
affirmative  preliminary  determination,  the  Department  has another  ninety  days
to refine  its  initial  estimate  of dumping  margins  or subsidy  levels  and  to
issue  a  final  determination  of dumping  or subsidy.  During  this  second  cycle,
meetings  are  arranged  upon request  between  the  Department  and  affected
exporters  and importers  to solicit  additional  information  and  to advise
traders  about  the  basis  on  which  dumping  margins  were established.
After  an affirmative  final  determination  by the  Department,  the  Trade
Tribunal,  which  has  twenty-five  to thirty  days  left  to complete  its  own injury
inquiry,  enters  the  decisive  phase  of its  deliberations  with a formal  hearing.
The  hearing  is  conducted  in both  public  and  confidential  sessions  as an
aeversarial  process  between  the  opposing  parties.  Users  of the  product  under
investigation  may also  testify.  In line  with Canada's  two-track  system,
however,  the  function  of the  Tribunal  hearing  is to allow  a detailed  probing
only  of evidence  pertinent  to the  question  of  material  injury;  no discussion
is allowed  of the  rate of duty  or subsidy  announced  in the  Department's  final
determination.1  The Trade  Tribunal's  finding  of "injury,"  "partial  injury,"
or "no  injury"  marks the  end of the  maximum  120-day  period  following  the
10Department's  preliminary  determination.  The  Tribunal's  decision  is final;  no
appeal  or review  of evidence  is  allowed.  Thus  the  entire  "unfair"  trade
remedies  process,  from  receipt  of a properly-documented  complaint  to the
Tribunal's  injury  decision,  usually  occurs  within  240  days  or eight  months.
A finding  of injury  generally  requires  elimination  of the full  margin  of
dumping  or level  of subsidy  determined  by the  Department:  the  Tribunal  has  no
authority  to require  that  duties  cover  only  a portion  of the  dumping  or
subsidy  margin.' 9 Both  provisional  duties  (on  imports  that  entered  between
the  time  of the  preliminary  determination  and  the  Tribunal  finding)  and  final
duties  (on  future  imports)  are  assessed.  In practice,  exporters  (and  their
counterpart  Canadian  importers,  who  by law  must  make the  payments)  avoid
paying  antidumping  duties  by raising  their  prices  to normal  values (discussed
below);  in the  case  of countervailing  duties,  the  importer  must pay  duties
equal  to the  assessed  amount  of subsidy  (unless  the  exporting  country
government  collects  an offsetting  export  tax).  Tha result  is that  domestic
producers  receive  a level  of protection  equal  to the  full  assessed  dumping  or
subsidy  margin.  This  relatively  high  level  of protection  stands  in sharp
contrast  to the  GATT's  stated  preference  for  measures  that  sliminate  only
material  injury  when the  margin  of injury  is lower  than  the  margin  of
dumping. 2" Unless  the  Tribunal  initiates  a review  and  continues  its
affirmative  injury  finding,  duties  are  rescinded  after  five  years  --  a  new
provision  of the SIMA  legislation.  While  this  sunset  clause  ensures  periodic
review  of definitive  duties,  it  may actually  increase  the  protectionist  slant
of enforcement  by forestalling  earlier  reviews  (as  argued  by R.Gotlieb  and
reported  in Stegemann  1984,  45).  On the  other  hand,  any  intereated  party  can
make application  to the  Tribunal  at any time  following  the  injury
determination  to have  the  finding  reviewed.
Thus the  remedies  under  the "unfair"  trade  laws  increase  market  prices
and  effectively  eliminate  the foreign  competition.  And, as argued  below,  the
remedies  may even  promote  collusion.  In contrast,  comparable  remedies  under
criminal  and  civil  provisions  of the  competition  laws  are  designed
11specifically  to  alter  anticompetitive  behavior.  The punitive  sanctions  (in
practice,  large  fines)  are  designed  to affect  the  profits  of the  offender  (and
offended,  if  recovery  of damages  is included)  rather  than to  affect  market
prices,  while  remedial  orders  prohibiting  the  abusive  behavior  are structured
to preserve  or enhance  competition.
(ii)  Normal  values  and  subsidies  determination.  An understanding  of how
the  "margin  of dumping"  and the  "amount  of subsidy"  are  determined  is crucial
in evaluating  the  impact  of the  "unfair"  trade  laws  on national  economic
interests.  Since  exporters  (in  the  case  of a finding  of injury  due  to dumping)
generally  will raise  their  prices  fully  to the  level  of normal  value  to avoid
paying  duties,  the  way normal  values  are  calculated  directly  affects  the
ultimate  level  of protection  received  by domestic  industries  whose complaints
are successful;  similarly,  in the  case  of a finding  of injury  due to
subsidization,  the  way the  amount  of subsidy  is calculated  directly  affects
the domestic  sales  price  of the imported  goods.  Although  the  new  rules
governing  pricing  determination  are  similar  in substance  to their
predecessors,  they  are set  forth  in  much  more detail.
SIMA  defines  the "dumping  margin"  as the  difference  between  normal  value
and  export  price,  expressed  as a percentage  of normal  value.  In general,
establishing  the  export  price  is relatively  straightforward:  it is  the
exporter's  ex factory  (fob)  sale  price.  Determining  normal  value  requires  more
analysis  since  the  objective  is to calculate  a representative  sales  price  for
similar  goods  in the  exporting  country's  home  market.
Under  Canadian  law,  the  primary  method  for  determining  normal  value  is
the  home-country  selling  prlce  approach, 2' or the  price  charged  in the  home
market  for  the  product  when sold  to customers  at the  same  trade  level  as the
importer.  This  price  is adjusted  for  such differences  between  home-market
sales  and sales  to the  Canadian  importer  as trade-level  quantity,  quality,
transport,  and  terms  of payment.  If the  exporter's  sales  are  primarily  for
export,  other  sellers  in the  home  country  may be substituted  for  the  exporter.
A new  provision  of the  SIMA  legislation  requires  that  prices  be screened  for
12full  cost recovery:  home  market  sales  at prices  that  do  not provide  for  the
recovery  of full  costs  plus profits  must be excluded  (Buchanan  1985,  17).22
An exporter  that  is  more efficient  than  Canadian  competitors  may be
subject  to antidumping  duties  even  if the  home-country  selling  price  exceeds
the  export  price  for  economically  justifiable  reasons  (justifiable  in the
sense  that  the  exports  are  not sold  below  cost  but  earn  a profit).  This
situation  can  occur  if  markets  are  segmented  and  the  exporter  maximizes
worldwide  profits  through  international  price  discrimination;  such  behavior  is
welfare-improving  to the  extent  that  it results  in higher  sales.
Where  a "sufficient  numb2t"  of sales  cannot  be identified  using  the
primary  method  rules,  normal  vli'.e  4s to  be determined  either  by using  a  home-
country  export  price  approach  or a  constructed-value  approach  (SIMA,  s.19),  or
if  prices  deviate  from  competitive  market  ones  because  of government-
monopolized  trade  or price  controls,  by using  a third-country  selling  price
approach  or a third-country  constructed-value  approach  (SIMA,  s.20).  What
constitutes  a "sufficient  number"  of sales  is left  to the  discretion  of the
Department;  prior  to SIMA,  this  determination  was governed  by explicit  rules.
Under  the  export  price  method,  the  price  of similar  goods  sold  by the  exporter
to importers  in  a country  other  than  Canada  is used,  but  only if the  goods  are
not  dumped  in that  market  as  well.  The  new restriction  requiring  the  exclusion
of all  sales  below  full  cost  plus  profit  also  applies  for  such  export  sales.
However,  the  Department  has  rarely  determined  normal  value  according  to this
method (Magnus  1989,  196).
The  most common  secondary  method,  the constructed-value  approach,  is  a
fully  distributed  or stand-alone  costing  approach.  The  constructed  value is
calculated  from  the  exporter's  actual  total  costs  of production  including  both
fixed  and  variable  costs,  plus an amount  for  profits  (the  exporter's  weighted
average  profit  rate on sales  of like  goods,  or close  substitutes  thereof,  if
calculable,  or an 8 percent  rate  otherwise,  applied  to the  net-of-profit
constructed  cost).  In  contrast  to the  former  legislation,  SIMA  provides  more
detailed  directions  for  the  determination  of constructed  cost,  for  example  the
13requirement  that  all  costs  directly  attributable  to the  design  and  engineering
of the  goods  be included.
For  establishing  normal  values  in the  special  case  of state-controlled
economies,  where export  trade  is  monopolized  by the  government  or domestic
prices  are  controlled,  the  Department  has  the  discretion  of using  either  a
method  based  on sales  (the  primary  selling  price  approach  but in a designated
surrogate,  third  country)  or a  method  based  on costs  of production  (the
constructed-value  approach  in a third  country). If these  methods  are
"unsatisfactory",  the  price  of like  goods  exported  to Canada  from  a surrogate
country  can  also  be used.  Clearly,  if labor  and  other  production  costs  are
lower  in the  state-controlled  economy  than  in the  surrogate  country,  assessed
normal  value  will be significantly  higher  than  the  price  paid  by the  Canadian
importer.  If sufficient  information  is  not availeble  for  any  of these
secondary  methods,  SIMA  specifies  that  normal  vzalue  is to be determined  by
ministerial  discretion.
As under  the  primary  method,  even  a profitable  exporter  may be subject
to duties  under  the  two  home-country  based  secondary  methods  of calculating
normal  value.  Demand  characteristics  may lead  a profit-maximizing  exporter  to
charge  a  higher  price  in the  third  country  than  in Canada,  but the  export
price  approach  would  still  result  in a finding  of dumping.  And  under  all  of
these  approaches,  the  excl'sion  of sales  below  cost  will result  in
overestimation  of the  economically-relevant  costs.
Under  Canada's  competition  laws,  the  accepted  methodology  for
calculating  costs  in order  to determine  whether  a price  is "unreasonably  low"
differs  sharply  from  these  approaches.  Competition  policy  principles  would  not
automatically  view even a  price  below  average  variable  cost as sufficient
proof  that  a  price is "unreasonably  low";  the  state  of competition  in import
and  export  markets  would  also  have to  be explicitly  considered.  Competition
law  also  requires  that  pricing  behavior  be evaluated  as part  of a "practice"
or "policy"  to avoid  interfering  with isolated  pricing  behavior  undertaken  for
legitimate  reasons.  This is in sharp  contrast  to the  constructed-value
14approach,  which  may result  in the  finding  of a dumping  margin  sufficiently
large  to restrict  imports  simply  because  of an exporter's  failure  to adjust
export  prices  to new exchange  rates  without  any  lag --  even  though  this is
clearly  an artifact  of short-run  changes  in exchange  rates  and  depends  on the
time  at  which  prices  are  measured.
Analysis  of data  obtained  form  the  International  Economic  Relations
Division  of the  Department  of Finance  (IER)  highlights  the  particularly
distortionary  methodology  generally  used for  state-controlled  economies.  The
level  of economic  development  of surrogate  countries  usually  has  been far
higher  than  that  of the  exporting  country,  leading  to unreasonably  high  normal
value figures  and  inflated  dumping  margins.  Positive  margins  of dumping  have
been found  in all  investigations  of goods  exported  from  state-controlled
economies. 25 In the  period  before  SIMA,  for  example,  when the  method  of
determining  normal  value  was left  to  ministerial  specification,  all six
investigations  initiated  against  China  used  the  third-country  selling  price
approach,  with Denmark,  West Germany,  Japan,  Malaysia,  the  United  Kingdom,  and
the  United  States  as the  designated  surrogate  countries. 2 4 Five  of the six
cases  resulted  in definitive  duties.  During  the  SIMA  period,  four  of the five
investigations  ir.itiated  against  Poland  used the  third-country  selling  price
approach,  with Brazil,  France,  West Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  as the
surrogate  countries;  the fifth  investigation  used the  third-country
constructed-value  approach,  with Portugal  as the  surrogate  country.  Three  of
the  five  cases  resulted  in definitive  duties.
A comparison  of the  methods  used for  determining  normal  value  during  the
19P08  'n the  pre-SIMA  period  (1980-84)  and  under  SIMA (1985-89)  reveals  that
the  constructed-value  approach  has  become  more common  under  the  new
legislation  (table  1).  (Data  on dumping  investigations  initiated  during  the
1980s,  disaggregated  by exporting  country,  were available  from  IER  for  over
four-fifths  of all  industry-country  pairs.)  The  home-country  selling  price
approach,  on its  own,  was  used in roughly  20  percent  of instances  under  both
former  and  current  legislation.  Use of  ministerial  discretion  as  a  means  of
15determining  normal  value  has  apparently  diminished  under  SIMA.  The
constructed-value  approach,  on the  other  hand,  alone  or in combination  with
other  methods,  has  been  used  more frequently  under  SIMA (the  frequency  of use
of the  constructed  value  approach  applied  on its  own  has almost  doubled). In
addition,  the  requirement  under  SIMA  that  all  sales,  even  under  the  home-
country  selling  price  and  third-country  approaches,  be screened  for  full  cost
recovery --  a procedural requirement that is not reflected in the
classification  by  method  --  marks  an important  difference  between  the  two
periods.  In effect,  this requirement  means  that  the  methodology  of the
constructed-value  approach  has  become  pervasive  during  the  SIMA  period.
The  method  used  for  determining  dumping  probably  has  an impact  on the
type  of exporting  industries  that  are found  to  be dumping  and so  on the
domestic  industries  most likely  to launch  effective  complaints.  Given  the
predominant  use of the  constructed-value  methodology,  exporting  firms  most
likely  to be found  to  have  high assessed  normal  values  and  therefore  positive
dumping  margins  are  those  with significant  fix2d  capital  costs  of production,
firms  with lumpy  capital  requirements  that  routinely  face  excess  capacity
during  the  business  cycle,  and  multiproduct  firms  that  measure  profitability
on groupings  rather  than  on specific  products. 25
Canadian  law  provides  less  direction  in its  treatment  of the  "amount  of
subsidy",  and the  meaning  of "subsidy"  is  not limited  by any  precise
definition  in SIMA. 26 The  SIMA  regulations  (FTA  revision  1989)  provide  rules
for  determining  subsidy  levels  for  grants,  loans  at preferential  rates,  income
tax  credits,  refunds  and  exemptions,  deferral  of income  taxes,  over-refund  of
indirect  taxes,  and government  procurement  practices.  The  Department's  view on
"generally  available"  (and  therefore  not countervailable  programs)  versus
"targeted"  (and  hence  countervailable  programs)  is set  out in an appendix  to
the recent Graln  Corn  case.  Again, ministerial discretion is to be used when
information  is deficient.
(iii)  Price  undertakings  as an avenue  for  compromise.  Foreign  exporters
or governments  facing  actions  under  the "unfair"  trade  laws  may propose  an
16undertaking  before  the  Department  makes  its  preliminary  determination;  this
option  was not  available  under  the  former  legislation.  In the  case  of a
dumping  investigation,  exporters  may  offer  price  undertakings,  in essence
commitments  to raise  the  export  price  or to cease  dumping.  In the  case  of a
subsidy  investigation,  foreign  governments  may offer  a price  undertaking  --  to
limit  or remove  the  subsidy  --  or a quantitative  undertaking  --  to limit  the
volume  of exports.  These  short-cut  agreements,  if accepted  by the  Department,
effectively  terminate  the  investigation  at an early  stage.  Undertakings  are
then  subject  to a three-year  sunset  clause;  they  must  be reviewed  prior  to the
expiration  of this  three  year period.
Although  settlement  by undertaking  avoids  the additional  costs  of a
full-length  proceeding, 2 7 the  decision  has  to be made by the  exporter  or
foreign  government  before  the  preliminary  determination  is issued.  In choosing
this  option,  therefore,  the  accused  party  is required  to restrict  exports
before  knowing  the  outcome  of either  the  preliminary  "unfair"  pricing
investigation  or the  detailed  injury  investigation.  Furthermore,  any  party
involved  in the  investigation  may veto  the  Department's  acceptance  of an
undertaking  within  thirty  days,  in  which  case the  investigation  continues.
Undertakings  therefore  do not  undermine  the interests  of the  complainants.
The intent  of the  undertaking  provision  seems  to have  been  to expedite
the  process  and  reduce  costs  (Martin  1984,  4).  The  years  of experience  with EC
policy  undertakings  was crucial  in the  decision  to include  undertakings  in
SIMA.  In Canada,  undertakings  were intended  as a  major innovation  for  regular
use (Stegemann  1990,  27-9),  a contrast  to  U.S. policy,  which  views  them  as an
exceptional  alternative  to the full-length  procedure.  Under  the  EC system,
there  is also a revenue  reason  for  seeking  undertakings,  since  exporters  (in
the case  of dumping  investigations)  can  collect  the  revenues  from  price
increases  only  when settling  by price  undertaking  (customs  authorities  collect
the  revenues  if EC duties  are  imposed).  Under  the  Canadian  system,  exporters
charged  with dumping  can routinely  recoup  the  difference  (since  Canadian
duties  are  not imposed  on sales  for  which  the  price  has  been raised  to the
17assessed  normal  value).  Apparently,  the  undertakings  option  was limited  to the
period  before  the  Trade  Tribunal  phase  of the  investigation  to ensure  that the
prozess  would  be significantly  shorter  than  the full-length  procedure  and  to
avoid  having  "a bureaucrat  undermining  something  that is  goieg  on before  a
court"  (Stegemann  1984,  38).
Two aspects  particular  to  undertakings  reflect  competition  policy
concerns.  One  is that  undertakings  allow  the  application  of measures  that
eliminate  only the  material  injury  whereas  an affirmative  injury  finding  in a
full-length  proceeding  requires  elimination  of the  full  margin  of dumping."
This provision  allows  for  compromise  on the  amount  of the  price  increase
required  of exporters  and,  in principle,  allows  them  greater  market  access.  In
practice,  only five  of the  ten  price  undertakings  accepted  under  SIMA during
1985-89  were intended  to raise  prices  only  enough  to eliminate  material  injury
rather  to eliminate  the  full  dumping  margin. 29
A second  aspect  of undertakings,  one  that  has troubled  Canadian
competition  authorities,  is their  potential  to facilitate  collusion  (McDonald
1989,  63).  Since  the  complainants  provide  information  to the  Department  on
acceptable  price  levels  and  are  again  consulted  on prices  before  final
acceptance  of an undertaking,  exporters  could  cooperate  and  exchange
information  and  use  the  undertaking  procedure  to arrange  international  price
cartels  or market  sharing.  Undertakings  substitute  a bureaucratic  process  of
trade  management  by government  negotiation  for  a quasi-judicial  Tribunal
process  open  to the  public.  Two  requirements  offer  some  safeguards  against
collusive  pricing  agreements:  an undertaking  must  not increase  the  price  by
more than the  assessed  dumping  margin,  and  each  exporter  must give  individual
price  undertakings.  Unfortunately,  this  last  provision  "does  not  preclude
discussions  with...an  association  representing  a group  of exporters  during  the
period  leading  up to the  offer  of an undertaking"  (1987  edition  of the  SIMA
Officers  Manual,  as quoted  in Stegemann  1990,  61),  though  such  discussions
should  be strictly  for  the  purposes  of explaining  the  process  and  Department
requirements.  However,  different  exporters  can find  common  ground  in such
18meetings,  and  SIMA  does  not  prohibit  communication  among  suppliers.  The  rapid
reaction  of several  exporters  in submitting  their  proposals  for  price
undertakings  in the 1987  carbon  steel  welded  pipe case  suggests  that exporters
may well  have communicated  with each other  (Stegemann  1990,  63).
While  the  Canadian  government  is aware  of the  potential  anticompetition
effect  of undertakings,  the  concern  about  facilitating  collusion  does  not (but
should)  extend  more generally  to the  antidumping  mechanism  itself,  which  has a
price-raising  impact  similar  in effect  to that  of collusive  behavior.
(iv)  Injury  determination  and  the  public  interest  provision.  The  Trade
Tribunal  must determine  whether  the  dumping  or subsidizing  found  in the
Department's  investigation  has  caused  or is likely  to cause  material  injury  to
the  Canadian  industry  producing  "like  goods."  Because  the  procedures  involved
in this  process  --  determining  like  goods,  defining  the  domestic  industry,  and
determining  material  injury  and  causation  --  all  affect  the  competitiveness  of
the  domestic  economy,  the  Tribunal's  role  under  SIMA  includes  a new  public
interest  advisory  function.
The  Tribunal's  first  task  is to  determine  the  class  of like  goods,
defined  as  products  that  are  identical  in all  respects  to the  product(s)  under
consideration  or products  that  have "uses"  and other  characteristics  closely
resembling  those  of the  product  in question.  In  practice,  "uses"  has  come  to
be determined  by a "functional  similarity"  test  based  on market  criteria:
whether  the  goods  can  be substituted  for  each  other  and  whether  the  same
consumers  are  being  sought.  Apparently,  the  Tribunal  is prepared  to consider
cross-elasticities  --  to  consider  dissimilar  products  that  compete  with each
other  functionally  as like  goods.  This trend  is a desirable  departure  from  the
previous  "identical/similar  characteristics"  definition  based  on physical
features.'°
In defining  the  domestic  industry,  Canadian  law  refers  to "production  in
Canada"  and "producers  constituting  a  major  proportion  of total  domestic
production."  Injury  from  the  imports  must be to domestic  production  for
domestic  consumption  (the  goods  with  which  imports  compete)  rather  than  to
19domestic  production  including  exports.  SIMA  provides  no guidance  on  what
constitutes  a "major"  proportion  of domestic  production.  In  practice,  the
Tribunal  has  adopted  a  very loose  standard  that does  not require  the
complainant  producers  to constitute  more than  50 percent  of the industry;  at
least  eight  cases  in the  IER  database 3' fall  below  this  threshold,  with the
smallest  share  being  as low  as 35 percent.
SIMA  does  not define  the  term "material  injury,"  and  whether  material
injury  has  occurred  is left  to the  Trade  Tribunal  to  determine. 32 Certain  key
criteria  have  been applied  in practice,  however*  A comparison  of the criteria
used  by the  Tribunal  before  SIMA (1980-84)  and  under  SIMA (1985-89),  based  on
a sample  of over four-fifths  of all  investigations  that  resulted  in the
imposition  of definitive  duties,  shows  a strong  similarity  in emphasis  (table
2). "Price  suppression"  was the  most frequently  cited  injurious  effect  of
investigated  imports  (25  to 30 percent  of investigations),  followed  closely  by
"decline  in  market  share"  (22  percent  of investigations).  These  were followed
by "profitability,"  "output  decline,"  "employment,"  and "growth".  A wider
variety  of "other"  injurious  effects  wes cited  during  the  SIMA  period  than
before.  In general,  many of the  criteria  were cited  concurrently  in  a single
investigation;  in only  nine cases  out  of 42 during  the  pre-SIMA  period,  and in
one  case  out  of 25 during  the  SIMA  period  was the  application  of only one
criterion  apparently  deemed  sufficient  (either  "price  suppression",  "decline
in  market  share"  or "future  injury").
On the  crucial  question  of causation,  the  Canadian  procedures  are
considered  to be "the  most  probative  of all  the  GATT  jurisdictions"  (Magnus
1989,  217).33  Several  factors  are  typically  examined  in determining  whether  a
causal  link  exists  between  the "unfairly"  priced  imports  and  the  assessed
material  injury:  the  actual  and  potential  volume  of "unfairly"  priced  imports
in  Canada,  any  significant  increase  in these  imports,  their  effect  on domestic
prices  or on production  in Canada,  and  evidence  of  margin  erosion,  price
suppression,  or any  significant  undercutting  of the  prices  of Canadian  goods.
Often  central  to the  causation  inquiry  is the  question  of  whether  any  loss  of
20market  share  by the  domestic  industry  can  be directly  attributed  to the
"unfairly"  priced  imports.  Findings  of "no  injury"  have been issued  in cases
where the  relevant  cause (a  declining  market,  lack  of an established
reputation,  startup  and  production  difficulties,  or other  factors)  was not
related  to "unfairly"  priced  imports  and in  cases  where the  imports  were found
to be a cause  of the  assessed  injury  but  not  an important  one.34
A comparison  of ;hese  procedures  on injury  and causality  with injury
standards  under  Canada's  competition  laws  shows  an important  difference.  All
the factors  typically  examined  under  the  "unfair"  trade  law  focus  on injury  to
domestic  producers,  whereas  comPatition  law  practices  focus  on preventing
injury  to the  competitive  procoss --  pricing  behavior  generally  is  prohibited
only if it lessens  competition  or eliminates  a competitor.  The "unfair"  trade
legislation  does  not  preclude  a finding  of injury  in the  case  where the
importing  country's  industry  is less  efficient  (less  productive)  than  the
exporting  country's.
A major  new provision  of Canadian  "unfair"  trade  legislation  (section
45)  --  and  one  unmatched  by U.S.  or EC 35 provisions  --  empowers  the  Trade
Tribunal  to examine  the  impact  of a positive  injury  finding  and  of asesessed
duties  on the  public  interest.  Should  the  Tribunal  find  the collection  of such
duties  to be contrary  to the  public  interest,  it  must submit  a report  to the
minister  of finance  advising  what alternative  level  of duty  would best  serve
the  public  interest.  The  law sets  no lower  limit,  and  the  minister  has the
discretion  to choose  the  final  level  or even  to eliminate  the  duty  completely.
The  concept  garnered  some  support  from  developing  countries  in Geneva  and  was
seen  as a possible  useful  first  step in  having  economywide  concerns  introduced
into  antidumping  and  countervail  proceedings.
The  public  interest  provision  was  motivated  by concerns  that  the
previous  legislation  focused  on domestic  producer  interests  without  adequately
considering  the  effect  of duties  on downstream  users  and  consumers.  While  the
national  interest  provision  was viewed  as a safeguard  for  user-industries  and
consumer  interests 36 (a  preference  for  low-priced  goods),  section  45 contains
21no criteria  for  guiding  the  Tribunal's  determination  of  what is in the  public
interest  or which  cases  qualify  for  consideration.  (The  Tribunal  is  not
required  to consider  the  public  interest  in each  case.)  Neither  does it
contain  any  recommendations  for  subsequent  action  by the  minister  of finance
once  a report  is received.  The current  legislation  does  not direct  the
Tribunal  to adopt  the  type  of  methodology  implicit  in an economywide
perspective,  that is,  it does  not  require  that  each antidumping  and
countervail  investigation  reaching  the  Tribunal  be assessed  by comparing  its
long-run  benefits  and costs  to the  economy  as a  whole to determine  how the
national  economic  interest  would  best  be served.  In the  absence  of other
guidance,  the  Tribunal  has reasoned  that  SIMA,  like  all  Canadian  legislation,
was enacted  in the  interest  of the  public  good,  and  that section  45,  as a
specific  provision  within  the  statute,  "is  to  be applied  on an exceptional
basis,  as for  instance  when the  relief  provided  producers  causes  substantial
and  possibly  unnecessary  burden  to users (downstream  producers)  and consumers
of the  product"  (Canadian  Import  Tribunal  1987,  2).
In practice,  only  three  public  interest  hearings  have  been  held sitce
the  enactement  of SIMA,37  and  only  one (the  Grain  Corn case)  resulted  in a
report  to the  minister.  Despite  considerable  speculation  that  a public
interest  inquiry  might  be launched  in the  recent  Women's  Footwear  case,  this
never  happened.  (Both  these  cases  are  examined  in greater  detail  later  in this
paper.)  It seems  likely,  in light  of the  Tribunal's  stated  intention  to apply
the  public  interest  provision  only  on an exceptional  basis,  that  the  provision
will be invoked  primarily  in response  to organized  pressure  from  consumer,
intermediate  producer,  and  user groups  to  protect  their  own interests.
III.  "Unfair"  trade  enforcement  experience  in the 1980s
While  an examination  of the  legislation  can tell  us something  about  the
intentions  of policy  makers,  only  enforcement  experience  can tell  us about  the
economic  impact  of the legislation.  A broad  comparison  of  enforcement  practice
22in the 1980s  before  and  after  enactment  of SIMA indicates  that  the
protectionist  bias of Canadian  practice  has  changed  little,  if at all.  On
balance,  enforcement  practice  may even  have  become  slightly  more
protectionist.  An examination  of selected  "unfair"  trade  cases  Allustrates  the
extent  to  which  application  of current  legislation,  including  the  public
interest  clause,  diverges  from  the  economically  more rational  practices  that
would  prevail  under  a  competition  policy  or an economywide  perspective.  And a
discussion  of  the  cross-border  competition  law  proposal  put forward  by Canada
during  negotiations  for  the  Free  Trade  Agreement  with the  United  States
reveals  that  more economically  rational  alternatives  to  current  practices  are
workable.
III.).  Review  of recent  enforcement  practices
(1)  Frequency  and  disposition  of cases.  The  number  of "unfair"  trade
investigationis  or cases  initiated  during  the  1980s  gives  a rough  idea  of  how
frequently  these  measures  were used.  A given  case is directed  at one  or more
exporters  in  one or  more ccuntries;  an industry  may raise  successive
complaints  over  the  years  (or  within  a year)  for  similar  products  exported
from  different  countries,  leading  to a succession  of separate  cases  over  that
period. 38 The focus  on cases  initiated  (rather  than  on the  number  of
countries  with exporters  accused  of discriminatory  pricing)  is  appropriate
since  the  investigation  of  each  case  is triggered  by the  complaints  of a
particular  domestic  "industry."  This  makes  the  information  particularly
relevant  for  an assessment  of the  degree  of  protection  provided  through
'"unfair"  trade  remedies  practices  since  the  number  of cases  corresponds  to the
number  of instances  that specific  domestic  industries  potentially  receive
protection.  Even if  no dumping  or injury  is found,  the  number  of cases
initiated  is indicative  of the  level  of uncertainty  created  since  exporters
may respond  to an increase  in cases  by raising  prices  themselves  to avoid
being  challenged.
23Of  the 145  investigations  initiated  during  the 1980s,  138  concerned
dumping  and 14 concerned  subsidies  (some  cases  involved  both). 39 While  82
cases  were initiated  in 1980-84,  and  63 cases  in 1985-89,  it is not  possible
to conclude  from  the  number  of cases  alone  that  there  was any  dramatic  change
in  enforcement  practice  in the  SIMA  period  (table  3).  Changes  in the
macroeconomic  environment  probably  explain  much of the  difference  between  the
two  periods.  A lower  number  of cases  would  be expected  during  the  post-
recession  upswing  in  Canada  thas  roughly  coincided  with the  SIMA  period  than
during  the  previous  period,  when cases  were probably  motivated  by depressed-
demand  adjustment  difficulties.  One change  in enforcement  practice  that  doee
seem  related  to the  SIMA  legislation  is the increased  use of countervailing
duty remedies:  from  6 percent  (five  of  eighty-two  cases)  before  SIMA to 14
percent  (nine  of sixty-three  cases)  under  SIMA.
The disposition  of cases  in the  two  periods  also  provides  litte  evidence
of any  marked  change  in enforcement  practice.  The  proportion  of cases
resulting  in "effective"  price  increases  --  whether  through  the  imposition  of
duties  or through  price  undertakings  (which  are also  formal  agreements  to
raise  export  prices)  --  went from  65 percent  of the  cases  initiated  in 1980-84
to 60  percent  during  the  SIMA  period.  This  finding  suggests  a relatively  high
but  constant  level  of protectionism  in  practice.
A  comparison  of the  level  of "effective"  price  increases  as a percentage
of  assessed  normal  value in  the  two  periods  suggests  that  the  level  of
protection  provided  to domestic  industries  by "unfair"  trade  remedies  has
actually  increased  under  SIMA (figure  1).  "Effective"  price  increases  were
derived  from  information  on ninety-five  country-specific  observations  for
1980-84  and seventy-five  observations  for  1985-89  for  each  country  in  wnich
exporters  were required  to pay  duties  or had  negotiated  undertakings.4 0 A
comparison  of the  two  distributions  shows  that  "effective"  price  increases
resulted  in higher  absolute  levels  of protection,  on average,  in the  SIMA
period.  Fifteen  instances  of  price  increases  higher  than  40 percent  of normal
value (or  an equivalent  duty  rate  of more than  67  percent)  occurred  in the
24pre-SIMA  period,  and  twenty-six  in the  SIMA  period.  Alternatively,  given  a
decision  to raise  prices,  the  probability  that  the  ptUce  increase  would  be 40
percent  or greater  was 16  percent  in the  pre-SIMA  period  and  a significantly
higher  35 percent  in the  more recent  years.
The  duration  of the  remedies  imposed  also  affects  the  degree  of
protection  provided  by "effective"  price  4ncreases.  Changes  in the  stock  of
outstanding  remedies  provides  an indication  of their  duration  (table  4). (The
stock  of cases  under  enforcement  for  each  year  was calculated  by taking  the
stock  outstanding  from  the  previous  year  and  adding  new remedies  imposed  and
subtracting  old  remedies  revoked.)  The  increase  in the  outstanding  stock  of
"effective"  price  increases  during  1980-84  was due to the  large  number  of new
remedies  imposed  in 1980-83  compared  to the  smaller  number  of existing
measures  revoked.  This increase  was  no doubt  largely  attributable  to the
increased  demand  for  protection  by domestic  industry  during  the recession  of
the  early 1980s.
The outstanding  stock  of remedies  stabilized  during  1985-89  but did  not
fall from  its 1983  level.  While  it is too  early  to tell  decisively  whether  the
five-year  sunset  clause  for  antidumping  and  countervailing  duties  under  SIMA
is  becoming  a floor  and  having  the  effect  of extending  the  average  period  of
protection,  available  evidence  suggests  such  a tendency.  Of the  measures
initiated  since  mid-1984  under  SIMA,  only  nine  were reviewed  before  the  end  of
1989  (and  only  two  of these  were rescinded).  Given  the  greater  importance  of
undertakings  in 1985-89  and  their  more frequent  mandatory  review  (a  three-year
sunset  clause),  a  more  pronounced  fall in the  stock  of cases  could  have  been
expected.  But  of the  five  undertakings  that  required  a review  before  the  end
of 1989,  only  one  has been  rescinded.
(ii)  Industry  and country  incidence.  The  frequency  with which  particular
domestic  industries  have  used "unfair"  trade  remedies  as a  vehicle  for  seeking
higher,  less  threatening  prices  from  foreign  exporters  has  been relatively
constant  across  both  periods  (table  5). By far  the  largest  number  of
complaints  during  both  periods  came from  the  primary  metals  group,  which
25accounted  for  over  one-fifth  of all  complaints.  Omitting  the  very diverse
"miscellaneous  manufacturing"  group,  the  other  industrial  groups  that  were
major  users  of "unfair"  trade  legislation  during  both  periods  were the  metal
fabricating,  electrical  products,  chemical  and  petroleum,  and  food  and
beverages  industries.
A striking  similarity  among  the  range  of products  subject  to complaints
is that,  generally,  very few  Canadian  firms  produce  them.  Given  the  narrow
definition  of the relevant  product  in  most cases,  Canadian  "industry"  is
usually  concentrated  in the  hands  of a single  or  very few  producers.  The
products  are also  internationally  comparable  and physically  easy  to trade.
Taking  the  metals  group  as a standard,  another  common  feature  across  the  many
targeted  products  is that  barriers  to  entry  are  relatively  low (it  has  been
fairly  straightforward,  for  example,  for  newly  industrializing  countries  to
enter  the basic  metals  production  industries).  Conversely,  barriers  to exit
are relatively  high.
Many of Canada's  countervailing  duty  cases  involve  the food  and
beverages  industry,  mostly  agricultural iports;  of Canada's  fourteen  subsidy
investigations  during  the 1980s,  seven  i  lved  agricultural  products.  In the
small  rLumber  of dumping  investigations  involving  crops,  the  domestic  industry
is,  in each  case,  organized  under  either  a provincially-sanctioned  marketing
board  or a producer  co-op  (Lexenomics  1990,  3.4).
The  geographic  incidence  of "unfair"  trade  investigations  initiated
during  the 1980s  also  demonstrates  some  clear  patterns  (table  6 and  7).
Comparing  cases  involving  developed  and  developing  countries  suggests  a
protectionist  bias against  the  developing  country  bloc:  while the  share  of
imports  from  developing  countries  was 13  percent  at the  mid-point  of the 1980-
84 period,  its share  of "unfair"  trade  cases  was twice  as large,  at 26 percent
(table  6).  More disturbing  for  developing  countries,  this  bias increased  in
1985-89:  while their  share  of imports  fell  slightly,  to 11  percent,  their
share  of "unfair"  trade  cases  increased  dramatically  to 44  percent.  Exporters
from  the  Asian  Tigers  bloc (in  particular  from  Taiwan),  Eastern  Europe,
26Brazil,  and  Mexico  were  much more frequent  targets  of complaints  in 1985-89
than in 1980-84.  Without  exception,  the  share  of "unfair"  trace  cases
initiated  against  all  the  developing  country  groups  in table  6 exceeded  their
respective  import  share  by a  wide margin  in the  later  period.  Undoubtedly,  a
major  reason  that  Eastern  European  countries  and  China  have such  high shares
of "unfair"  trade  cases  relative  to their  Canadian  import  shares  is the
particularly  discriminatory  methodology  used to  determine  normal  values  for
state-controlled  economies.
Given  the  overwhelming  importance  of the  United  States  in Canada's  trade
flows,  it is  not  surprising  that  U.S. exporters  were subject  to a large  number
of the  complaints  by Canadian  industry  against  developed  countries.  However,
the  U.S. share  of 'unfair"  trade  complaints  in  both  periods  (15  and  23
percent)  is dwarfed  by the  U.S. share  in Canada's  imports,  which  was about  70
percent  in both  periods.  Part  of the  reason  for  the  discrepancy  between
"unfair"  trade  case  shares  and  import  shares  is the importance  of the  Canada-
U.S.  Automotive  Products  Agreement,  which  created  an integrated  North  American
market  in automotive  products  in  which  Canadian  producers  do not  have
incentives  to  bring  complaints  against  their  U.S.  counterparts.
The  most-discriminated  against  countries  --  those  subject  to more than
five  investigations  during  either  five-year  period,  of which  more than  two-
thirds  resulted  in "effective"  price  increases  --  were  Brazil,  China,  and
Korea  for  the  1980-84  period,  and  Brazil  and  Taiwan  for  the  1985-89  period
(table  7).  All  are  within  the  developing  country  bloc.  Brazil  is included  in
both five-year  periods,  with "effective"  price  increases  resulting  for  all  six
cases  initiated  against  it in the  earlier  period  and  five  of the  seven  cases
in the  later  period.  Brazil  also  was subject  to the  greatest  number  of subsidy
cases (shown  in  brackets  in table  7) durirg  1985-89;  the  other  major  target  of
subsidy  investigations  was the  EC,  which  had four  cases  initiated  against  it
during  the  1980s.  The  most  frequent  user  of price  undertakings  (shown  in
parentheses  in table  7)  was the  United  States,  with five  instances,  followed
by Japan,  with two instances.
27111.2.  Selected  "unfair"  trade  cases
A more detailed  examination  of  several  "unfair"  trade  cases  offers  some
insights  into the  forces  involved  in  these  investigations  and  the  principles
applied  in their  resolution.  Of particular  interest  is the  way in  which the
public  interest  provision  figured  in two  of these  cases.
(i)  The  Grain  Corn case.  On  May 12,  1986,  the  Department  received  a
formal  complaint  from the  Ontario  Corn  Producers  Association  alleging
injurious  U.S. subsidization  of grain  corn (excluding  seed  corn,  sweet  corn,
and  popping  corn)  exported  to  Canada.  The Department  initiated  an
investigation  on July  2, 1986  and  reached  a final  determination  on February  2,
1987,  that  imports  of grain  corn from  the  United  States  were benefiting  from  a
subsidy  of US$0.849  per  bushel  (roughly  CAN$1.10  at the  time).  On March  6,
1987,  the  Trade  Tribunal  announced  a finding  of  material  injury  to the
production  in  Canada  of like  goods.
This  case is particularly  notable  for  two  reasons.  First,  it represented
only  the  second  time that  the  United  States  had  been subject  to a formal
subsidy  complaint."  Second,  this  case  was the  sole  instance  in  which an
application  of Canada's  public  interest  provision  led  to a reduction  in the
level  of duties  imposed.
During  the  material  injury  inquiry,  the  Trade  Tribunal  received
representations  from  several  Canadian  corn  users  (the  feed industry,  hog and
poultry  producers,  industrial  corn  users,  distillers  and  brewers)  claiming
that imposition  of the  duty  would  not  be in the  public  interest;  several
hundred  individuals  also  sent letters  (Herman  1987,  417).  The  Tribunal
examined  the  public  interest  issues  and  advised  the  minister  of finance  on
October  20, 1987,  that  a duty  higher  than  CAN$0.30  per bushel  would  not  be in
the  public  interest.  The  Tribunal  argued  that a  duty above  that level  would
provide  little  additional  relief  from  injury  to Canadian  corn  producers  while
creating  a  major irritant  for  corn  users.  Thus,  the  Tribunal  argued  that  it
had ample  scope  In this  Instance  to form  an opinion  pursuant  to section  45
"without  having  to evaluate  competing  claims  as to how  injury  and  benefits
28should  be distributed  between  domestic  interests...or  without  making  use of
new  and  unfamiliar  welfare  economics-based  methodologies"  (Canadian  Import
Tribunal  1987,  5-6).
The  minister,  after  receiving  the  public  interest  report,  met  with and
received  submissions  from  various  interest  groups,  including  the  original
complainants  and  corn  users.  On February  4, 1988,  the  minister  announced  that
the  duty  was being  reduced  to CAN$0.46  per  bushel  and that  the  Tribunal  would
be asked  to reconsider  the  public  interest  issue  in roughly  eighteen  months;
the  review,  dated  December  29, 1989,  recommended  no further  modification.
As this  case  highlights,  Canadian  experience  with its  public  interest
provision  has been  very limited  and  disappointing  from  a  national  economic
efficiency  perspective.  The  provision  has  not been  used  as a  mechanism  to
promote  an economywide  perspective:  the  domestic  producers  received  as  much
benefit  as was realistically  possible  from  government  protection,  while
alternative  schemes  that  might  better  serve  the  national  economic  interest
were not  considered.  Domestic  producers  gained  at the  expense  of consumers.
What  was atypical  in this  case,  however,  was that  users  who  would  be hurt by
higher  domestic  prices  were able to  organize  themselves  effectively  to request
a  public  interest  hearing.  And  the  hopeful  sign,  from  an economywide
perspective,  was that this  case  demonstrated  that  consumers  do have  a forum  in
which  their  interests  can  be heard  --  and  that  this  process  can  result  in
policy  changes.
(ii)  The  Korean  Cars case.  On July  15, 1987,  the  Department  initiated  an
investigation  in response  to complaints  submitted  by General  Motors  (Canada)
and  Ford (Canada)  alleging  dumping  of cars  produced  by the  Hyundai  Motor
Company  of Korea.  The  Department's  final  determination  of February  19, 1988
found  dumping  margins  ranging  from  6.5  percent  to 61.9  percent,  for  an overall
weighted  average  of 26.3  percent.  The  Trade  Tribunal,  however,  ruled  on  March
23,  1989,  that the  dumping  had  not  caused  nor  was likely  to cause  material
injury  to production  of like  goods  in  Canada,  and so  no duties  were levied.
29This case is  notable  primarily  because  of the  active  intervention  of the
director  of investigation  and  research,  in his  role  as the  general  Canadian
competition  watchdog,  in  two  written  submissions  and in  a formal
representation  at the  Trade  Tribunal's  public  hearing  on competition  and  trade
practices  in the  automotive  industry.  The  director  argued  that  Hyundai  was a
positive  competitive  influence,  providing  consumers  with more competitive
prices  and  greater  product  choices.  He stressed  the  importance  of such
competitive  influence  and  of not  weakening  or nullifying  it by inappropriate
application  of trade  restrictions.  The  director  also  noted  that  the  Tribunal,
in past cases,  had  taken  into  account  the  GATT directive  that  injuries  caused
by other  factors  must not  be attributed  to the  dumped  imports.  In this
connection,  he cited  growing  world overcapacity  for  passenger  car  production,
the  displacement  of Canadian  production  by "captive"  imports,  the  use of
incentives  to eliminate  excessive  inventories,  and  the  shift  of consumer
preferences  toward  smaller  cars (Canadian  Import  Tribunal  1988a,  10-4).
The director's  participation  apparently  had  an important  impact:  the
Tribunal's  summary  rationale  stressed  that  "Hyundai's  imports  'Wre but  one  of
many factors  operating  in a  very dynamic  market"  and  that "given  the  intense
competition  from  other  participants...price  suppression  cannot  solely  be
attributed  to the  dumping....  As to the future,  ...  Hyundai  will be but one  of
many participants  in an increasingly  competitive  and  globalized  environment"
(Canadian  Import  Tribunal  1988b,  28-9).
(iii)  The  Women's  Footwear  case.  In the  first  half of 1989,  several
meetings  were held  between  the  Shoe  Manufacturers'  Association  of Canada  and
the  Department  to discuss  complaints  of dumping  and  subsidies  of  women's
footwear.  Following  the  receipt  of an initial  complaint  lacking  sufficient
detail  and  a subsequent  revised  complaint,  the  Department  initiated  an
investigation  on August  25, 1989  of alleged  dumping  of  women's  footwear  from
Brazil,  China,  Taiwan,  Poland,  Romania,  and  Yugoslavia,  and  the  subsidization
of  women's  footwear  from  Brazil.  In its  final  determination  of April  3, 1990,
the  Department  found  weighted  average  dumping  margins  of 26.1  percent  for
30Brazil,  47.3  percent  for  China,  38.7  percent  for  Poland,  20  percent  for
Romania,  27.5  percent  for  Taiwan,  and  26.2  percent  for  Yugoslavia;  the  amount
of subsidy  was calculated  at  between  3.5  percent  and 17.4  percent.  One  month
later,  the  Trade  Tribunal  announced  a finding  of  material  injury  in all  cases.
The final  outcome  of this recent  case  raises  two  important  issues.  One
concerns  the substitution  of trade  remedies  for  other,  less  politically-
acceptable  forms  of protection.  Since  the  late  1960s,  the  domestic  footwear
industry  had  been facing  growing  import  competition,  especially  from  low-cost
countries.  In 1977,  footwear  imports  represented  56 percent  of the  apparent
Canadian  market,  an increase  of 16  percent  over 1973 (Canada  1987,  2).  That
same  year,  after  a finding  of injury  by the  Antidumping  Tribunal,  which
explained  the increased  foreign  penetration  as a consequence  of a competitive
advantage  arising  from  lower  labor  costs,  a three-year  global  quota  on
nonrubber  footwear  was introduced.  Women's  footwear  quotas  actually  remained
in  effect  much longer,  until  November  1988.  Three  months  later,  the  footwear
industry  initiated  formal  efforts  to replace  the  expired  quotas  with trade
remedies.  Continued  protection  of footwear  is  particularly  distressing  in
light  of the  findings  of an empirical  study  that  removing  all footwear  quotas
for  the 1978-83  period  would  have  resulted  in an average  annual  net increase
in  welfare  of $8.58  million  (in  constant  1978  Canadian  dollars),  and  total
cumulative  social  adjustment  costs  of $0.84  million  compared  with cumulative
gains  in consumer  surplus  of $41.38  million  (Moroz  and  Salembier,  1985).
This case  also  demonstrates  how infrequently,  under  current  legislation,
more rational  principles  from  an economywide  perspective  (such  as a  broader
public  interest  inquiry  and  active  intervention,  under  the  Competition  Act, of
the  Director  of Investigation  and  Research)  are  incorporated  into  enforcement
practice.  The Tribunal,  in issuing  its  reasons  for  the  injury  decision,
invited  submissions  from  parties  who  wished  to conduct  a public  interest
inquiry.  The  Tribunal  received  only  one  submission,  from  China,  which  it did
not find  convincing,  and  announced  a decision  not to conduct  a public  interest
inquiry.
31Why  was there  no domestic  response  to this issue?  Perhaps  the  parties
felt  that  they  would  be unable  to affect  the result,  believing  that the
Tribunal  had  bent  over  backwards  to see  the  facts  from  the  domestic  industry's
perspective.  Or perhaps  they  had other,  more urgent  concerns.  Whatever  their
reasons,  the  case  highlights  the  dependence  of a public  interest  inquiry  on an
exceptionally  strong  lobby  of  users,  intermediate  producers,  and  consumers.
Similarly,  participation  by the  Director  of Investigations  and  Research  is
likely  to be ccntingent  on several  factors  or constraints,  including  an
evaluation  of the  economic  stakes  involved.  In this  case,  it  may  be that  the
decision  not to  participate  was based  on a comparison  of the  competitive
status  of the industry  and  its importance  in the  overall  economy  against  the
availability  of financial  resources  and  the  relative  expertise  of staff  in the
Department  of Consumer  and  Corporate  Affairs.  Important  (though  readily
feasible)  changes  in the  existing  legislation  would likely  be required  before
principles  in line  with an economywide  perspective  could  be consistently
applied  in Canada.
111.3.  The  Canadian  proposal  for  a cross-border  competition  law
In negotiations  for  the  Free  Trade  Agreement  (FTA),  Canada  and the
United  States  had implicitly  decided  that  multilateral  channels  and  procedures
were  not, at that  time,  the  preferred  route  for  meeting  their  objectives.  One
proposal  put forward  by Canada  called  for  each  country  to replace  existing
antidumping  laws  with compatible  competition  policy  procedures.  This  proposal
was not adopted,  but  an examination  of  why it  was rejected  may help in
assessing  what scope  exists  for  a greater  emphasis  on competition-based
principles  in the  enforcement  of "unfair"  trade  policies.
A little  background  on recent  trade  disputes  between  Canada  and  the
United  States  is  useful  for  an understanding  of  Canada's  position  in the  FTA
negotiations.  Canada,  with its  much smaller  economy,  is far  more dependent  on
international  trade  than  is the  United  States.  While  many  Canadian  firms
export  a substantial  proportion  of their  production  to the  United  States,  very
32few  U.S. firms  are  in a similar  position  relative  to  Canada.  There  is further
assymetry  between  Canada  and  the  United  States  in their  ability  under  the  GATT
codes  to take countermeasures  to subsidies.  Small  export-dependent  economies
have  much less  scope  to engage  in subsidy  practices  without  challenge  and  less
scope  to counter  others'  subsidy  practices  than larger,  less  export-dependent
economies.' 1 That  Canadian  exports  to the  United  States  were  more likely  to
be countervailed  than  U.S. exports  to Canada  was an important  factor  in
persuading  business  leaders  and  government  officials  in  Canada  to  pursue
bilateral  negotiations  for  fundamental  reforms.
During  the  FTA  negotiations  in 1985-87,  Canada  raised  the issue  of
whether  participation  in a free  trade  zone  should  involve  not  only  elimination
of tariffs  but also  coordination  of competition  procedures".  Since  the  type
of price  discrimination  motivated  by trade  barriers  at the  border  would  no
longer  be possible,  firms  involved  in  bilateral  trade  would  follow  the  types
of pricing  strategies  that  are  currently  regulated  by domestic  competition
laws.  The  standards  governing  pricing  strategies  would  then  be based  on injury
to competition  rather  than  injury  to competitors.  Canada  proposed  that,
following  the removal  of tariffs,  a set  of compatible  domestic  competition
laws should  regulate  the  pricing  strategies  of firms  involved  in  bilateral
trade.
Because  the  competition  laws  in both  countries  had  attained  a relatively
similar  stage  of development,  it  was deemed  feasible  to deal  with undesirable
private  cross-border  pricing  practices  using  price  discrimination  and
predatory  pricing  laws.  The laws  on price  discrimination  would  require
elimination  of several  differences  in  substance.  Common  rules  would  be needed
to reduce  jurisdictional  conflicts  and to facilitate  the  gathering  of
evidence,  and  special  rules  would  need to be developed  for  handling  third-
country  price  discrimination,  since  this  was not  covered  in existing  national
laws.  On the  issue  of remedies,  a remaining  obstacle  was the  divergence
between  the  treble-damages  rules  of  U.S. antitrust  laws  and the  relatively
weaker  Canadian  remedies.  However,  the  group  of trade  and  competition
33officials  that  examined  the  proposal  concluded  that,  at a technical  level,  all
these  deficiencies  could  be resolved.
A stalemate  over  reform  of the  subsidies-countervailing  duty  issue  seems
to have  been the  main reason  the  proposal  was  not included  in the  final
agreement.  In this  area,  Canadian  objectives  could  not  be  met, given
prevailing  political  imperatives  in the  United  States.  The  devised  solution
included  in  the  FTA,  however,  did  recognize  that  "unfair"  trade  laws  should  be
applied  in a bilateral  fashion:  dumping  and subsidy  disputes  between  Canada
and  the  United  States  are  now subject  to bilateral  review,  and  the decisions
of a bilateral  panel  are  final  and  binding."
It is interesting  to speculate  whether  a country  may  have  more success
in a  multilateral  context  in  pushing  new rules  based  on competition
principles.  In the  EC,  cross-border  sales  within  the free  trade  zone  are
treated  as domestic  sales,  exempt  from  member  nations'  antidumping  and
countervailing  duty  laws;  EC competition  laws  regulate  the  cross-border
pricing  behavior  of  member  country  firms.  Apparently,  introducing  such  changes
was possible  in the  case  of the  EC member  countries  because  they shared  the
joint  goal  of a common  market  and  because  member  countries  believed  that  their
individual  rights  were protected  by the  existence  of two  supranational
institutions,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Court  of Justice;  it
may have  also  been that  at the  time  when these  changes  were introduced,
individual  member  countries  did  not know  what potentially  powerful
protectionist  policy  tools  they  were giving  up.  The  United  States  was clearly
unwilling  to follow  the  EC precedent  in dealing  with Canada.  In the  Canada-
U.S.  negotiations,  each  party  had fundamentally  different  perceptions  of the
problem.  But in a  multilateral  forum,  a small  economy  might  have stronger
negotiating  possibilities  since  its  own  problems  may  be common  to  many
participants.  On the  other  hand,  the  regime  now in  place  between  Australia  and
New  Zealand  that  has replaced  antidumping  measures  with provisions  of their
respective  competition  laws  suggests  that  the  scope  for  desirable  changes
clearly  also  exists  within  bilateral  contexts." 5
34IV.  Conclusion
Canada's  recent  experience  with enforcement  of "unfair"  trade  laws  shows
little  evidence  of influence  from  competition  policies  or an economywide
perspective.  The result  has  been high  levels  of protection  for  a  small  number
of  well-organized  firms.  Throughout  the 1980s,  the  methodology  for  calculating
dumping  margins  and  assessing  injury  generally  led  to affirmative
determinations  in instances  that  would  not  be considered  actionable  under
competition  law.  Serious  predatory,  anticompetitive  concerns  were  probably  not
at issue  in any  of the  cases  in  which  antidumping  duties  were assessed.
Canada's  recent  overhaul  of its  "unfair"  trade  legislation  was not
followed  by any  dramatic  change  in  enforcement  practice,  as a comparison  of
practices  before  and  after  SIMA shows.  In fact,  a comparison  of the  actual
levels  of "effective"  price  increases  suggests  that  the  protectionist  bias of
Canadian  enforcement  has  increased.  Information  on the  broad  regional  pattern
of "unfair"  trade  investigations  suggests  that  the  bias against  exports  from
developing  countries  has  also  increased  significantly  in the  years  following
the implementation  of SIMA.
This  paper  has argued  that  an approach  based  on competition  policy
principles  or on an economywide  perspective,  by focusing  on the  broader  impact
of policies  (beyond  the  direct  benefits  received  by the few  firms  seeking
preferential  treatment),  offers  a  more economically  rational  way of dealing
with the issues  currently  addressed  by "unfair"  trade  remedies.  The concrete
proposals  Canada  presented  during  the  FTA  negotiations  to regulate  Canada-U.S.
cross-border  pricing  issues  by competition  principles  demonstrate  that  the
competition  policy  alternative  is  workable.  However,  as Canada's  "unfair"
trade  laws  are  currently  administered,  the  economywide  perspective  fits in
more readily  than  competition  policy.  Relatively  minor  changes  to existing
laws --  requiring,  for instance,  mandatory  public  interest  hearings  to
explicitly  consider  the economywide  impact  of proposed  measures  by making  a
modified  section  45 an automatic  structural  component  of each antidumping  and
35countervail  case  considered  by the  Tribunal  --  are  readily  feasible  from  the
legislative  and  administrative  points  of  view.  Unfortunately,  international
standards,  as codified  in  the  GATT and  as  practiced  by the  United  States,  the
EC,  and  Australia,  weigh  against  Canada's  modifying  its  current  standard.
Canada,  the  first  country  to institute  an antidumping  system,  is now
constrained  from  adopting  more  sensible  policies  by the  weight  and  momentum  of
the system  it  helped  to develop.
36References
Australia,  Attorney  General's  Department.  1990.  "Review  of Developments  of
International  Trade:  Recent  Developments  in  Trans-Tasmar.  Business  Law."
(Paper  presented  at the  XVIIth  International  Trade  Law  Conference,
September  1-2,  1990).  Mimeo.
Boner,  R.A.,  and  R. Krueger.  1991.  "The  Basics  of  Antitrust  Policy:  A Review
of Ten  Nations  and the  EEC."  World  Bank,  Industry  Series  Paper  No. 43,
Washington,  D.C.
Buchanan,  J.N. 1985.  "Antidumping  Law  and  the  Special  Import  Measures  Act."
Canadian  Business  Law  Journsl  11:  2-22.
Canada,  Department  of Finance.  1980.  "Proposals  on Import  Policy:  A Discussion
Paper  Proposing  Changes  to Canadian  Import  Legislation"  (the  "White
Paper").  Ottawa.
Canada,  Department  of Finance.  1985.  "Annex  of Outstanding  Antidumping
Actions."  In Semiannual  Report  of  Antidumping  Actions,  July 1, 1984-
December  31, 1984.  Ottawa.
Canada,  Department  of Industry,  Science,  and  Technology.  1987.  Industry
Profile:  Footwear.  Ottawa.
Canada.  1988.  Competition  Act. (Office  Consolidation)  R.S. 1985,  c. C-34,
various  amendments,  Ottawa.
Canada.  1989a.  Special  Import  Measures  Act. (Office  Consolidation)  S.C. 1984,
c. 25,  amended  by 1985,  c. 14,  1986,  c. 1,  Ottawa.
Canada,  Department  of Revenue,  Customs  and  Excise.  1989b.  "Special  Import
Measures  Act Regulations."  (FTA  Revision,  March  31,  Memorandum  D14-1-1).
Ottawa.
Canada,  Department  of Supply  and  Services  (Statistics  Canada).  Various  years.
Canada Year Book. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
Canadian  Import  Tribunal.  1987.  "Public  Interest:  Grain  Corn."  Report  of the
Canadian  Import  Tribunal  under  Section  45  of the Special  Import  Measures
Act, October  20.  Ottawa.
Canadian  Import  Tribunal.  1988a.  "Preliminary  Submission  of the  Director  of
Investigation  and  Research  appointed  under  the  Competition  Act."
(January  6).  Ottawa.
Canadian  Import  Tribunal.  1988b.  "Additional  Submission  of the  Director  of
Investigation  and  Research  appointed  under  the  Competition  Act."
(February  8).  Ottawa.
Canadian  Import  Tribunal.  1989.  Annual  Report  1988.  Ottawa.
Chen,  T. 1987.  "Are  the  anti-dumping  laws  of Canada  and  other  Western
countries  keeping  pace  with China's  economic  structural  reform?"  Law and
Policy  in International  Business  19:  717-64.
Feltham,  I.R.,  S.A.  Salen,  R.F.  Mathieson,  and  R.  Wonnacott.  1990.  Competition
(Antitrust)  and  Antidumping  Laws  in the  Context  of the  Canada-U.S.  Free
Trade  Agreement.  (A Study  for  the  Committee  on Canada-United  States
Relations  of the  Canadian  Chamber  of Commerce  and  the  Chamber  of
Commerce  of the  United  States).  Drart.
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  1980.  "Agreement  on
Implementation  of  Article  VI of the  General  Agreement  on Tarilfs  and
Trade."  In  Basic  Instruments  and  Selected  Documents.  Twanty-Sixth
Supplement.  Geneva.
Giese,  J. 1987.  "The  Special  Imports  Measures  Act:  Balancing  the  Interests  of
Foreign  Exporters  and  Canadian  Industries."  Journal  of World  Trade  Law
21:  9-25.
Gillen,  M.R.,  L.A.W.  Hunter,  D.E. Rosenthal,  and  W.T. Miller.  1987.  "Canadian
and  U.S.  Antitrust  Law:  Areas  of Overlap  Between  Antitruct  and  Import
Relief  Laws."  Canada-United  States  Law  Journal  12:  39-73.
Goldman,  C.S. 1987.  "Competition,  Antidumping,  and  the  Canada-U.S.  Trade
Negotiations."  Canada-United  States  Law  Journal  12:  95-106.
Green,  C. 1990.  Canadian  Industrial  Organization  and  Policy.  Toronto:  McGraw-
Hill  Ryerson.
37Grover,  W., and  R. Kwinter.  1987.  "The  New  Competition  Act."  The  Canadian  Bar
Review  66:  267-304.
Hart,  M. 1989a.  "Dumping  and  Free  Trade  Areas."  In J.H.  Jackson  and  E.A.
Vermulst,  eds.,  Antidumping  Law  and  Practice.  Ann  Arbor:  University  of
Michigan  Press.
Hart,  M. 1989b.  "The  Canada-United  States  Working  Group  on Subsidies:  Problem,
Opportunity  or Solution?"  (Octobet  draft).  Center  for  Trade  Policy  and
Law,  Carleton  University,  Ottawa,  Canada.
Herman,  L.L. 1987.  "Injury  Findings  by the  Canadian  Import  Tribunal:  The
Decisive  Elements."  Review  of International  Business  Law 1:  373-418.
Hunter,  L.A.W.,  and  J.F.  Blakney.  1987.  "The  Changing  Canadian  Competition  Law
Environment:  Implications  for  International  Business."  Review  of
Internstional  Business  Law 1:  235-57.
Lexenomics  Inc. 1990.  "The  Relationship  between  Competition  Policy  and
Antidumping  Law:  The  Canadian  Experience."  (January).  Ottawa.
Magnus,  P.A. 1989.  "The  Canadian  Antidumping  System."  In J.H.  Jackson  and
E.A.  Vermulst,  ed.,  Antidumping  Law and  Practice.  Ann  Arbor:  The
University  of Michigan  Press.
Martin,  R.J. 1984.  "Background  and  Main  Elements  of the  Special  Import
Measures  Act."  In K. Stegemann,  rapporteur,  Report  of the  Policy  For-m
on  Special  Import  Measures  Legislation.  Kingston,  Ontario:  John  Deutsch
Institute  for  the  Study  of Economic  Policy.
Maule,  C.J.,  and  T.W.  Ross.  1990.  "Canada's  New  Competition  Po'icy."  George
Washington  Journal  of International  Law  and  Economics  23:59-109.
McDonald,  F. 1989.  "The  Relationship  between  Antidumping  and  Competition
Policies."  in P. Slayton  and  S. Cass,  eds.,  Trade  Law Topics.  Toronto:
Butterworths.
McFetridge,  D.G.,  and  S.  Wong. 1985.  "Predatory  Pricing  in  Canada:  The  Law
and  The  Economics."  The  Canadian  Bar  Review.  63:685-733.
Metzger,  S. 1979.  "The  Amended  Antidumping  Code  and the  Trade  Agreements  Act
of 1979."  In J. Quinn  and  P. Slayton,  eds.,  NonTariff  Barriers  after  the
Tokyo  Round.  Montreal:  Institute  for  Research  on Public  Policy.
Moroz,  A.R., and  G.E. Salembier.  1985.  "A  Quantitative  Assessment  of the  Costs
and  Benefits  of the  Footwear  Import  Quota."  Discussion  Paper  in
International  Economics.  Ottawa:  Inetitute  for  Research  on Public
Policy.
Paterson,  R.K. 1986.  Canadian  Regulation  of International  Trade  and
Investment.  Toronto:  Carswell.
Porteous,  S.D.,  and  A.M.  Rugman.  1989.  "Canadian  Unfair  Trade  Laws and
Corporate  Strategy."  Review  of International  Buslness  Law 3: 237-70.
Rugman,  A.M.,  and  S.D.  Porteous.  1989.  "Canadian  and  U.S. Unfair  Trade  Laws:  A
Comparison  of Their  Legal  and  Administrative  Structures."  The  Canadian
Business  Law  Journal  16:  1-20.
Stegemann,  K. 1982a.  "The  Efficiency  Rationale  of  Antidumping  Policy  and  Other
Measures  of Contingency  Protection."  In J. Quinn  and  P. Slayton,  eds.,
NonTariff  Barriers  After  the  Tokyo  Round.  Montreal:  Institute  for
Research  on Public  Policy.
Stegemann,  R., rapporteur.  1984.  Report  of the  Policy  Forum  on Special  Import
Measures  Legislation.  Kingston,  Ontario:  John  Deutsch  Institute  for  the
Study  of Economic  Policy.
Stegemann,  K. 1990.  "Price Ledertakings  to Settle  Antidumping  Cases."
(February  draft).  Department  of  Economics,  Queen's  University,  Ontario,
Canada.
Stegemann,  K. 1991.  "Settlement  of  anti-dumping  cases  by price  undertaking:  Is
the  E.C.  more liberal  than  Canada?"  In P.K.M.  Tharakan,  ed.,  Policy
Implications  of  Antidumping  Measures.  Amsterdam:  Elsevier  Science
Pu lishers  B.V.,  North-Holland.
Varian,  H.R. 1989.  "Price  Discrimination."  In R. Schmalensee  and  R.D.  Willig,
eds.,  Handbook  of Industrial  Organization.  Vol.I.  Amsterdam:  Elsevier
Science  Publishers  B.V.,  North-Holland.
38Table 1 Determination  of normal value in Canadian  'unfair"  trade cases:
frequency  of methods applied, 1980-84  and 1985-89
(percentages)
Before SIMA  Under  SIMA
Method  (1980-84)a  (19 85-89)b
Home-country selling price  19  19
(exclusively)
Home-country selling price  14  1
(together with ministerial specification')
Third-country selling price  4  12
(exclusively)
Third-country selling price  1  0
(together with ministerial specification 0)
Combination of home-country and  1  0
third-country selling price
Constructed-value  12  21
(exclusively)
Combination of constructed-value  33  39
and other' methods
Ministerial specification'  16  8
(exclusively)
Note: Data for each investigation  were aggregated by country of export rather than
by exporter, so more than one method was often reported for a given industry-
country pair. While methods used in combination may be indicative of general
trends, the information is less precise since the underlying data does not indicate
for each exporter involved in an investigation  what percentage of its goods had
normal values established on each basis.
a. Sample of 141 antidumping industry-country  pairs.
b. Sample of 98 antidumping industry-country  pairs.
c. "Ministerial  specification"  was also at times referred to as "best information
available."
d. "Other" includes simultaneously  one or more of home-country selling price,
home-country export price, third-country selling price, third-country constructed-
value and ministerial discretion.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the International Economic
Relations Division, Department of Finance.
39Table 2 Determination of material  injury in Canadian "unfair" trade cases:
frequency of criteria applied, 1980-84  and 1985-89
(percentages)
Before SiMA  Under  SIMA
Criterion  (1980-84)"  (1985_89)b
Price suppression  29  25
Decline in market share  22  23
Profitability  17  18
Output  10  6
Employment  5  5
Growth  3.5  3
Productivity  3.5  0
Otherc  10(11)  20(16)
Sales loss/revenue loss  (6)  (6)
Future injury/threat of injury  (5)  (5)
Bankruptcies  (0)  (1)
Bounded injury (Aug. 15-Apr. 1)  (0)  (1)
Crop disposal  (0)  (1)
Financial losses  (0)  (1)
Injury in a previous case  (0)  (1)
Land-value decline  (0)  (1)
Note: Statistics are based on the subset of Tribunal investigations  that resulted in
positive findings of material injury for which information is available. For most
cases, more than one criterion is listed; when the "other" category is broken down,
more than one criterion is also sometimes listed.
a. Sample of forty-two cases.
b. Sample of twenty-five  cases.
c. Number in parentheses is number of times the criterion was used.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the International Economic
Relations Division, Department of Finance.
40Table 3 Disposition of Canadian "unfair" trade cases during the 1980s,
1980-84  and  1985.89
(number of cases)
Total  Terminated  before
Calendar  number of  primary  Price  Terminated  Duties
year  cases initiated  determination  undertakings  at Tribunal  assessed
Before SIMA
1980  14  2  0  3  9
1981  12  1  0  3  8
1982  25  [11  3  [1]  0  7  15
1983  16  [1]  1  0  5 [1]  10
1984  15  [31  0  1  4  10 [31
1980-84  82  [5]  7  [11  1  22 [1]  52 [3]
Under SIMA
1985  20  [21  3  2  3  12 [21
1986  14 (3]  4  2  2 (2]  6 (1]
1987  13  [1]  0  2  6  5  [1]
1988  8 (11  2  1  2  [1]  3
1989  8  [2]  2  2  1  3  [2]
1985-89  63  M9]  11  9  14 [3]  29 [6]
Total  145[14]  18 [1]  10  36 [4]  81  9M
Note: Numbers in brackets refer to cases that included subsidy investigations.
Source: Author's calculations, from the database of the International Economic Relations
Division, Department of Finance.
41Table 4 Canadian "unfair trade cases: flows and stocks, 1980-84  and 1985-
89
(number of cases)
Initiated in  Stock
year ending  New remedies  Old remedies  outstanding
31 December  to be imposed;  revokedb  at year endc
Before SIMA
1980  9  5  44
1981  8  4  48
1982  15  3  60
1983  10  3  67
1984  11  9  69
During SIMA
1985  14  14  69
1986  8  5  72
1987  7  6  73
1988  4  10  67
1989  5  5  67
a. All cases initiated in a given year that resulted in "effective"  price
increases (antidumping or countervailing duties or undertakings to raise
export prices).
b. Includes only cases in which injury findings  were rescinded; does not
include alterations.
c. Data for 1984 are based on Canada (1985), with the addition of three
countervailing duty cases that resulted in duties and one case initiated in
1984 that resulted in an undertaking. "Stock" for other years are approximate
and are calculated as the difference between imposed and revoked remedies
based on initiation dates and not on dates of duty effectiveness.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the International
Economic Relations Division, Departmen. of Finance; Canadian Import
Tribunal (1989) for data on "old remedies revoked";  and Canada (1985) for
"stock outstanding at year end."
42Table S Canadian "unair" trade cases Initiated during the 1980s by Industry, 1980-84  and 198S49
(number of cases)
Ind'  or P  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1980-84  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1985-89
Food and beverages  0  0  2  3  2  8  3  3  0  2  0  13
Textile  Industries  0  1  3  1  0  6  0  1  0  0  1  3
Clothing and footwear  0  1  4  0  0  6  0  0  0  0  1  1.5
Wood and paperproducts  1  1  0  0  2  5  0  0  0  0  1  1.5
Chemical and petroleum  3  1  2  1  0  8  3  1  3  0  1  13
Nonmetallic minerals  0  0  0  2  1  4  0  2  1  0  0  5
Primarymetal industries  2  1  11  2  5  26  2  3  3  2  0  16
Furniture and fixtures  1  0  1  0  2  5  0  2  0  1  0  S
Metal fabricating  1  3  1  1  0  7  3  1  1  1  1  11
Machinery  (nonel-ctric)  1  2  0  0  0  4  1  1  1  0  1  6
Transport equipment  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  2  0  0  S
Electrical products  3  2  0  2  1  10  3  0  0  2  1  9
Miscellaneous  manufacturing  1  0  1  4  2  10  4  0  2  0  1  11
Total  14  12  25  16  15  100  20  14  13  8  8  100
Source: Author's calculations,  from the database of the International Economic Relations Division,  Department of Finance, Canada.
43Table 6 Canadian  "unfaire trade cases initiated during the 1980s: shares in cases
and imports by developed and developing country groups
(percentages)
"Unfair trade investigations  share  Import share
Group/country  1980-84  1985-89  1982  1987
Developed countries  74.0  56.3  86.9  88.7
United States  14.5  22.7  70.5  68.0
Othere  59.5  33.6  16.4  20.7
Developing countries  26.0  43.7  13.1  11.3
Asian Tigersb  10.4  16.0  3.1  4.5
Korea  (7.5)  (7.6)  (0.9)  (1.6)
Taiwan  (0.6)  (5.9)  (1.0)  (1.7)
Eastern Europe'  5.8  11.8  0.4  0.3
Brazil  3.5  5.9  0.7  0.7
China  3.5  2.5  0.3  0.7
Mexico  0.6  2.5  1.5  1.0
Other  2.2  5.0  7.1  4.1
a. Includes all Western European countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
b. Includes Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
c. Includes the Soviet Union.
Source: Author's calculations based on "unfair"  trade inves.igations data from the
International Economic Relations Division, Department of Finance, and import
shares data from Statistics Canada, Canada Year  Book.
44Table 7 Canadian  'unfair"  trade cases and 'effective"  price increases initiated
during the 1980s, by country,  1980-84  and 1985-89
(in descending order by number of investigations  initiated)
Investigations  "Effective"  price increases
Country  1980-84  1985-89  1980-84  1985-89
United States  2s  27 [1]  16 (1)  14 (5)
Japan  12  11  8  7  (2)
West Germany  17  5  9  4  (1)
Korea  13  9  10  5
Italy  16 [21  3  5  2
France  12  4  [11  6  2
United Kingdom  9  5  5  4
Brazil  6  7  [5]  6  5  (1)
Spain  8[1]  2  4  1
Belgium  6  3  4  2
China  6  3  5  3
Taiwan  1  7  0  5
Poland  2  5  2  3
Sweden  3  3  3  2
Netherlands  5 [1)  0  4  0
Czechoslovakia  3  1  2  1
European Community  2 [2]  2 [2]  2  1
East Germany  1  3  1  2  (1)
Luxembourg  3  1  1  1  (1)
Mexico  1  3  0  1
Romania  2  2  1  0
Singapore  2  2  2  2
Hong Kong  2  1  2  1
Malaysia  1  2  1  2
Yugoslavia  1  2  1  2  (1)
Finland  3  0  0  0
Argentina  0  2  0  2
Austria  1  1  1  1
Portugal  2  0  1  0
South Africa  2  0  1  0
USSR  1  1  1  0
Chile  0  i  0  0
Denmark  1 [1]  0  1  0
Norway  1  0  0  0
India  1  0  1  0
Ireland  1  0  0  0
Switzerland  1  0  0  0
Turkey  0  1  0  0
Total  173 [71  119 [9]  106 (1)  76(12)
Note. Numbers in brackets are subsidy investigalions;  numbers in parentheses are price undertakings.
Source: Author's calculations  based on "unfaie"  trade remedies data from the International Economic Relations
Division,  Department of Finance and import shares data from Statistics Canada, Canada Year  Book.
45Figure 1 Canadian "unfair trade cases: levels of protection,  1980-84  and 1985-89
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46Notes
I  am grateful  for  helpful  comments  from  J. Michael  Finger,  Klaus  Stegemann,
and  participants  at a  Word Bank  workshop  on antidumping.  I  also  appreciate
discussions  with officials  at the  Canadian  International  Trade  Tribunal;  the
Department  of Consumer  and  Corporate  Affairs,  Bureau  of Competition  Policy;
Department  of Finance,  International  Economic  Relations  Division;  and the
Department  of Revenue,  Customs,  and  Excise,  Assessments  Program,  Customs
Programs  Branch;  and  with individuals  at the  Institute  for  Research  on Public
Policy  and the  Center  for  Trade  Policy  and  Law.
1. Canada's  first  antitrust  or competition  law  was  passed  in 1889 (Act  for  the
Prevention  and Suppression  of Combinations  Formed  in  Restraint  of Trade)  and
precedes  the  U.S. Sherman  Act (1890).  Price  discrimination  and  predatory
pricing  laws  were  added  in 1935,  when it  became  clear  that  certain  pricing
practices  helped  powerful  rather  than  efficient  firms.  Canada  invented  the
first  antidumping  system  in 1904 (An  Act to  Amend the  Customs  Tariff).  A
provision  for  countervailing  duties  (against  perceived  "unfair"  trade
practices  originating  in the  public  rather  than  private  sector)  was  not added
until  1955 (section  7),  however,  and regulations  to  make it  effective  were not
introduced  until  1977.  For  an overview  of the  history  of Canada's  competition
laws,  see  Maule  and  Ross (1990,  63-74);  on antidumping  law,  see  Magnus  (1989,
174-8);  and  on antisubsidy  law,  see  Hart (1989b,  especially  40-2).
2. Although  this  ambitious  proposal  did  not  become  part of the final
Agreement,  it is nevertheless  indicative  of Canada's  position  on the  general
principles  underlying  the  proposed  regime.
3.  As discussed  below,  an injury  test (that  is,  an "effect-on-competition"
test  where  the  pricing  activity  is measured  by its  effect,  intended  effect,  or
tendency  of lessening  competition  or eliminating  a competitor)  is  not  a
required  element  in the  law  on  vertical  price  discrimination.
4.  This point  is  made forcefully  in a recent  review  of the  competition
policies  of ten  nations  and  the  EC (Boner  and  Krueger  1991,  41 and  118).  The
Competition  Act, for  instance,  provides  for  customs  duty  reduction  as an
alternative  to asset  divestiture  to remedy  mergers  that  violate  the  Act. This
provision  was applied  successfully  as  part of the  remedy  in the  1989  Asea
Brown  Bovery  - Westinghouse  case;  the  merger  was allowed  to proceed  without
divestiture  as long  as existing  import  tariffs  were removed  and  A.B.B.
undertook  not to initiate  any  antidumping  investigation  to protect  its
position  for  a  period  of five  years.
5. The  director  already  had authority  to appear  before  federal  boards,
commissions,  or other  tribunals.  The  new  Act,  by authorizing  appearances
before  provincial  bodies,  strengthened  the  director's  capacity  to intervene  to
promote  competition  and efficiency  (Maule  and  Ross 1990,  61).
6. For a succinct  discussion  of the  few  actions  that  have been  brought  under
the  Competition  Act's subsections  50(l)(a)  (on  vertical  price  discrimination)
and (b) (on  geographic  price  discrimination),  see  Green  (1990,  379-80).  For  a
more detailed  discussion  on price  discrimination  and  predatory  pricing  and  a
47comparison  with  U.S. laws,  see villen  et al. (1987,  39-57)  and Feltham  et al.
(1990,  45-102).
7. The  principle  of  what constitutes  an "unreasonably  low"  price  is discussed
at length  in the  Hoffmann-LaRoche  case,  as summarized  in  McFetridge  and  Wong
(1985,  690-5).
8. The  Competition  Tribunal  issued  its  first  decision  under  the "abuse  of
dominant  position"  provision  on October  5, 1990,  in  The  Director  of
Investigation  and  Research  v. The  Nutra!veet  Company. The case is relevant  to
the  application  of competition  law  to transborder  business  practices  since  it
involves  a U.S.  enterprise's  activities  in  Canada  as well as imports  from
several  sources. For  a detailed  discussion  of the  civil  law  provisions  and
this  particular  case,  see  Feltham  et al. (1990,  62-75).
9. SIMA is the  principal  Canadian  legislation  for invoking  all "trade  remedy"
actions,  including  GATT  Article  XIX type  safeguard  actions.  The second
principal  statute  concerning  trade  remedy  actions  is the  Canadian
International  Trade  Tribunal  Act of 1988,  which  united  the  agencies
responsible  for international  trade  matters  (the  Canadian  Import  Tribunal,  the
Tariff  Board  of Canada,  and  the  Textile  and  Clothing  Board)  into  an
amalgamated  Canadian  International  Trade  Tribunal;  the  procedures  followed  in
antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  cases  remained  unchanged.
10.  Minutes  of the  Proceedings  and  Evidence  of the  Subcommittee  on Import
Pollcy  (1981-82),  cited  in  Rugman  and  Porteous  (1989,  3); see  also  Martin
(1984)  and  Hart (1989b,  40).
11.  Since  the  basic functions  of this  body  have not  changed  substantially  over
the  years (whereas  its  name  has, from  Antidumping  Tribunal  to  Canadian  Import
Tribunal  to Canadian  International  Trade  Tribunal),  it  will  be referred  to
consistently  as the "Trade  Tribunal."
12.  An investigation  can  also  be initiated  on the  Department's  own initiative,
although  this  option  rarely  occurs  in  practice.
13.  Canadian  producers  can take  as long  as is  necessary  to complete  a
"properly  documented"  filing.  The  complainant  must  provide  all supporting
material,  including  detailed  information  regarding  Canadian  production  of the
goods,  evidence  of dumping  or subsidizing,  and of  material  injury.  If the
complaint  is  not  properly  documented,  the  Department  will specify  in detail
what additional  information  or evidence  is required;  in this  sense,  Canadian
producers  are receiving  invaluable  assistance  not available  to foreign
exporters  or Canadian  importers.
14.  In the  United  States,  the  authorities  assume  that  the  complainant
represents  a majority  of  producers,  and  responsibility  for  disproving  this
assumption  rests  with the  exporter  or foreign  government  (Rugman  and  Porteous
1989,  5).  Although  the  Department  takes  a more  active  role in this
determination,  several  petitions  covering  less  than  half  of Canadian
production  have  been accepted,  as is discussed  later  in this  paper.
4815.  Since  the  Trade  Tribunal  is  the  specialist  body  on matters  relating  to
injury,  the  Department's  injury  inquiry  at the initiation  stage  is less  formal
and  based  on much less  information  than  the  Trade  Tribunal's  subsequent
inquiry  (Magnus  1989,  181-2).
16.  For  complex  cases,  this  can  be extended  to 135  days.  Also, the  Department
may terminate  the investigation  before  this  point  if it finds  that  evidence  is
insufficient  to justify  proceeding,  that  the  margin  of dumping,  the  volume  of
dumped  goods,  or the  amount  of subsidy  is  negligible,  or that  new evidence
suggests  no reasonable  indication  of injury.
17.  Although  the  Disclosure  of Information  provisions  of SIMA (sections  82-88)
permit  access  to confidential  information  on the  discretion  of the  Deputy
Minister,  current  administrative  practices  by Revenue  Canada  reportedly
prevent  such  access  (Magnus  1989,  180).
18.  As discussed  later,  the  public  interest  clause  provides  a caveat  to this
strict  separation  in  cases  where  imposition  of a duty in the  full  amount  might
not  be in the  public  interest.
19.  Interventions  resulting  in conceivably  different  price  changes  are  only
possible  under  two  mezhanisms:  price  undertakings  (which  must  occur  before  the
beginning  of the  TrJbunal's  injury  investigation)  and  the  public  interest
provision  (which  allows  for lower  duties  at the  discretion  of the  minister  of
finance);  these  are  discussed  later  in the  paper.
20.  Among  principal  users  of antidumping  measures,  only the  EC has  adopted
this  recommendation  (Stegemann  1990,  54-5).
21.  Section  15  of SIMA  outlines  the  determination  of normal  value  of goods,
basically  a rewording  of paragraph  1 of Article  VI of the  GATT  Antidumping
Code.  Note that  "primary"  here does  not  mean  most  common  practice  but rather
the  first  method  that  should  be used,  if possible.
22.  Before  the  Department  accepts  a series  of sales  as the  basis  for  normal
value  determination,  the  series  is examined  to determine  if it is  profitable
on average.  If so, the  series  could  be used  but all  sales  within  that  series,
even  those  at a loss,  are then  considered  in the  calculations.
23.  For  printed  evidence  until  mid-1986,  see  Chen (1987,  728);  state-
controlled  or non-market  economies  subject  to "unfair"  trade  investigations
during  the  1980s  include  China,  Czechos.ovakia,  East  Germany,  Poland,  Romania,
USSR and  Yugoslavia. Even  in post-SIMA  cases  where  undertakings  were
accepted,  estimated  margins  of dumping  were substantial,  as reported  in  Table
7  by Stegemann  (1990,  163).
24. In the  case  of hydraulic  turbines  exports  from  Japan  with components
shipped  directly  from  China  to  Canada  (ADT-9-84),  a  Japanese  exporter  involved
argued  that  the  surrogate  country  chosen  for  the  preliminary  assessment  of
normal  value  of Chinese  components  should  be changed  in  view  of  .he  different
levels  of development  of China  and  Japan. The subsequent  replacement  of India
for  Japan  as surrogate  country  resulted  in  a reduction  of the  assessed  dumping
margin  from  61 to 34  percent  (Chen  1987,  731-3).
4925.  For  a listing  of several  otheL  relevant  characteristics  of firms  most
likely  to offend  constructed-value  rules,  see  Lexenomics  (1990,  4.9-4.10).
26.  According  to SIMA (section  2[l]),  "Subsidy  includes  any  financial  or other
commercial  benefit  that  has  accrued  or will accrue,  directly  or indirectly,  to
persons  engaged  in the  production,  manufacture,  growth,  processing,  purchase,
distribution,  transportation,  sale,  export  or import  of goods,  as a result  of
any scheme,  program,  practice  or thing  done,  provided  or implemented  by the
government  of a country  other  than  Canada,  but does  not include  the  amount  of
any duty  or internal  tax  imposed  on goods  by the  government  of the  country  of
origin  or country  of export  from  which  the  goods,  because  of their  exportation
from  the  country  of origin,  have  been  exempted  or have  been or will  be
relieved  by means  of refund  or drawback."  While  the  U.S. countervailing  duty
statute  does  not define  what constitutes  a countervailable  subsidy,  the
Canadian  definition  is  so  broad  as to  be little  different  in  practice.
27.  These  costs  include  legal  expenses  as  well as the  possible  payment  of
duties  and all  the  costs  associated  with uncertainties  surrounding  the
investigation  (at  least  four  months  of uncertainty  regarding  the  outcome  of
the  case  are saved  since  the  undertaking  normally  must be settled  within  the
first  120  days following  receipt  of a properly  documented  complaint).
28.  In addition  to  being  in line  with the  GATT  code,  the  use of  measures  that
likely  raise  prices  by less  that  an otherwise-assessed  dumping  margin  is
motivated  by a practical  concern:  assessed  dumping  margins  are often  so  high
that  they  are  prohibitive,  completely  eliminating  exports  (Stegemann  1990,
55).  However,  it is  somewhat  problematic  to  make such  comparisons  on a case-
by-case  basis  since  undertakings  must  be accepted  before  there  has  been any
offical  "assessment"  of the  margin  of dumping/subsidization  (that  is,  before  a
preliminary  determination  is  made).
29.  Since  four  of the  the  five  cases  concerned  several  countries  with
considerable  variation  in  dumping  margins,  acceptance  of  undertakings
eliminating  full  dumping  margins  would  have resulted  in large  variations  in
prices.  So pragmatism  probably  played  as important  a role as any  concern  for
competition  promotion.  The  determination  of price  increases  sufficient  only to
eliminate  injury  is  difficult  in  practice,  especially  since  the  Department's
injury  investigation  is  very limited:  the  Department  generally  asks  the
complainant  for  an estimate  of the  price  required  to  eliminate  injury,  based
on domestic  full-cost  prices  plus a reasonable  profit.  The intended  effect  of
the  other  five  price  undertakings  was to eliminate  dumping  (Stegemann  1990,
57-9).
30.  This focus  on "uses"  was  absent  from  previous  Canadian  legislation.  The
U.S. statute  contains  a similar  reference,  but the  1979  GATT  code  does  not.
For  a  more detailed  discussion  of the  "like  goods"  determination  and the
reference  to the  actual  use  of the  cross-elasticity  concept,  see  Magnus  (1989,
202-8).
31.  Out  of a total  of 145  cases  initiated  during  the  1980-89  period,  as will
be reviewed  below.
5032.  SIMA  refers  only to "material  injury  to the  production  in Canada  of like
goods"  (section  2[1])  and  provides  no illustrative  lists  of factors,  indices,
or thresholds  of injury.  In contrast,  the  U.S.  legislation  explicitly  sets  out
factors  in line  with the  GATT  codes.  However,  the  Tribunal  has issued  a set  of
rules  that  includes  guidance  on the  evidence  that  should  be presented  on this
issue,  in line  with the  GATT codes  (see  Herman  1987,  391-3,  and the  citations
therein).
33.  See  Rugman  and Porteous  (1989,  9-10)  for  arguments  that  the  U.S.
International  Trade  Commission  has  not  analyzed  causality  in any  meaningful
way and that  the  search  for simple  correlations  predominates  (for  example,  it
is often  deemed  sufficient  if imports  are  seen to increase  at the  same  time
that industrial  performance  declines).
34.  Herman  (1987,  395-98)  concluded  from  an analysis  of recent  cases  that  the
Trade  Tribunal  applies  a  higher  standard  of Injury  than  that  suggested  by the
1979  GATT codes.
35.  The EC code  served  as a  model  for  section  45;  although  it does  not  concern
the  "public  interest",  it does  require  gains  or losses  from  dumping  to  be
examined  from  the  community  point  of  view,  that  is,  not  just from  the
producer's  point  of  view (Rugman  and  Porteous  1989,  10).  However,  the  EC's
motivation  seems  to  be largely  political  (to  promote  greater  cohesion)  rather
than  efficiency-based,  though  some  commentators  have argued  that  Canada's
motivation  was also largely  political.
35.  Concerns  and  recommendations  were expressed  in  deliberations  of the
Parliamentary  subcommittee  examining  the  proposed  legislation.  Canadian
legislators  apparently  did  not  want to  stray  too  far  from  GATT  code criteria
since  they  wanted  to ensure  that  Canadian  industry  received  the  same level  of
protection  as comparable  industries  in other  countries.  For  reflections  on
this  issue  and  explicit  reference  to consumer  interests,  see the  "Minutes  of
the  Proceedings  and Evidence  of the  Subcommittee  on Import  Policy,"  as quoted
in  Rugman  and  Porteous  1989,  10.
37.  Surglcal  Adhesive  Tapes  and  Plasters  from  Japan (initiated  on May 8,
1985),  Grain  Corn  from  the  U.S.  (initiated  on July 2, 1986),  and  Yellow  Onions
from  the  U.S.  (initiated  on  October  14,  1986).
38.  For  example,  two  separate  sets  of dumping  complaints  from  the  Canadian
small  electric  motors  industry  (polyphase  induction  motors,  1 to 200  HP
inclusive)  resulted  in  the initiation  of two  distinct  investigations  in 1985,
the  first  on February  7 (against  Brazil,  Japan,  Mexico,  Poland,  Taiwan,  and
the  U.K., including  a concurrent  subsidy  investigation  against  Brazil)  and the
second  on July  5 (against  Romania).  These  are included  in the  database  as two
separate  cases;  while  the  first  case  resulted  in  the imposition  of antidumping
duties  (and  countervailing  duties  against  Brazil),  the  second  case  was
terminated  following  a  finding  of  np material  injury.
39.  Under  SINA,  allegations  of dumping  and  subsidy  can  be investigated  in the
same  case.  Of the  fourteen  subsidy  investigations,  seven  were of this type
(one  case in  each of the  years  1983,  1984,  1985,  1987,  and 1988,  and  two  cases
51in 1989);  this  explains  why the  total  number  of trade  remedies  cases  is less
than  the  sum  of dumping  and  subsidy  investigations.
40.  Wh n information  on final  measures  imposed  was  unavailable,  preliminary
determination  levels  were used.  No information  at all  was available  for  eleven
country-specific  observations  in  the  pre-SIMA  period,  and  for  one  observation
in the  SIMA  period.  An equivalent  rate  of duty  as  a percentage  of export  price
can  easily  be computed  from  the  average  mandated  price  increase.  Let the
reported  duty (dumping  or subsidy  margin)  be denoted  by DM, the  assessed
normal  value  by n, and  the  export  price  by x. Given  that  DM  - (n-x)/n,  then
the  equivalent  rate  of export  duty is  given  by DC[1/(l-DH)]  - (n-x)/x.
41.  The  other  case,  brought  by the  EC against  petrochemical  feedstock,  was
unusual  since  it did  not arise  from industry  complaints  or considerations  of
injury  and  was settled  before  any  duties  were imposed  (Hart  1989b,  41).
42.  According  to the  GATT  codes,  subsidies  with an export-enhancement  effect
(a  subsidy  to firms  th.,t  export  a large  proportion  of their  production  to  one
country  might  be viewed  as having  this  effect)  can  be unilaterally
countervailed  by an importing  country.  Subsidies  with an import-displacement
effect  can  only  be countered  through  multilateral  procedures.  For  a more
detailed  presentation  of the  points  raised  in this  context,  see  Hart (1989b).
43.  The following  discussion  is  based  on an  excellent  summary  of the  issues
involved,  the  negotiations  and the  solution,  in  Hart (1989a,  336-42).  For a
detailed  examination  of the  feasibility  of relying  on each  country's  existing
competition  laws in  dealing  with  antidumping  complaints  in the  context  of the
FTA,  see  Feltham  et al. (1990).
44.  Under  Chapter  19 of the  FTA,  the  Ca.aadian  and  U.S. governments  agreed  to
work toward  the  development  of a substitute  system  of rules  for  antidumping
and  countervailing  duties  as applied  to their  bilateral  trade;  a bilateral
working  group  was created  with the  development  of such  a substitute  system
within  seven  years  as one  of its  main  objectives.
45.  Australia  and  New  Zealand  moved  toward  bilateral  free  trade  through  the
1983  Australia-New  Zealand  Closer  Economic  Relations  Trade  Agreement,  with
full free  trade  in goods  between  the two  countries  achieved  in 1990.  Article  4
of the  Protocol  on the  Acceleration  of Free  Trade  In  Goods (signed  in  August
1988)  required  that  competition  remedies  replace  antidumping  proceedures
between  the  two  countries.  These  obligations  were fulfilled  in Australia  by
the  Trade  Practlces  (Misuse  of Trans  Tasman  Market  Power)  Act 1990,  and in  New
Zealand  by the  Commerce  Law  Amendment  Act  and the  Judicature,  Evidence  and
Reclprocal  Enforcement  of  Judgments  Amendment  Acts,  laws  which  came into
operation  on July 1, 1990.  For  a discussion  of the  associated  new
investigation  and  enforcement  procedures  for  business  regulation  in the  free
trade  area,  see  Australia  (1990).
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